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a Brief :iiutory of the ™::d:::;al system
with 3mphasis on Recent Tronds.
The panic of 1907 has gone down in history as a great
evil. However its effects woro not altogothor and unrelieved-
ly evil for there was ono {rood effect — it shovzod tho dofocts
of tho banking system of that day and brou ;ht homo forcibly
tho need of scienco being np.iliod to bwflrtltfl if it v;as ovor to
rest on a substantial foundation. For tho five years follow-
ing tho panic thore was lively discussion of mothods and ty
:
os
of bankin • The kinds which came in for spoclal study were
tho throe types in practico at the beginning of tho twent loth-
century—1. tho highly contralisod as in England, 2. the inde-
pendent charter system of Canada, 5. tho freo frmMng plan of
which our national banking system was the loading example,
A commission was appointed by Congress to consider the
banking ouostlon, and after a lone study a fHDSHAX KBSEHTB
bill was brought boforo Congross in the spring of 1912.
Thero was draft aftor draft made and finally the eighth dm ft
was accepted and passed. Presidont .ilson signed the bill
Decombor 2£, 1915, thus ma!: in;-; that year a memorable ono in
tho financial history of the Unite; States, for it meant a
radical change from the old banking systora of tho country.
It also moant a triumph for tho president, for tho act was in
reality his plan, and but for his lcadorchip in attempting to
reform the banking situation, tho bill would not have passed.
(1)
II. P. 77illis summarises tho importance of the act and of the
(1) Willis. Tho redoral Reserve nyscem, p. 21

strugglo for its passage in those v7ords: "It is an account
of tho first battle in a campaign for safo and scientific
banking that has only just opened".
The preamble of the act states concisely tho general
purposes of this measure— "to provide for tho establishment
of Pi:DITIAL HBSBSVB banks, to furnish an elastic currency,
to afford means of rodiscounting commercial papor, to es-
tablish a more effect ivo supervision of banking in the
United States, and for other purposes."
Bofore taking up tho working out of those provisions,
it may be well to look at the dofocts of tho old system of
banking which this now type aimed to corroct. Those may
be briofly Bummed up undor four headings: l.deeontrnlisa-
tlon, 2. inolnsticity of credit, E. defec.ivc exchange raid
fl)
transfer system, 4. dofoctivo government depository 3ystcn.
Tho first of tho so rosultod from lack of unity and a central
consorvator sinco the reserves of all banks wore very scatter
ed, and thorofore ineffective in timo of neod. The second
defoct carao from tho lack of adjustment between cro .it and
bank not© circulation on ono hand and tho noods of trade on
tho othor. The third defoct concorning tho clearing of
chocks was responsible for tho bad praotico of 'routing"
chocks in order to avoid collection charges and the padding
of bank reserves rosulting from tho routing. This defect
also entailed groat eiqjcnso and trouble in connection with
(1) Zommerer. The A 3 C of tho federal ?.oserve System.
p

tho shipping of currency all over the country which was nec-
essary under tho old system. The fourth defect, arising
from the practice of keeping government funds in the nine
sub-treasuries and in certain national banks, brought v;ith
it the bad effects of hoarding idle funds in the treasury
vaults and of giving too much power to one person, the
Secretary of tho Treasury, ovor the money market. It was
tho panic of 1907 that proved this latter procoduro to be a
dangerous x,olicy.
To offset these groat defects, tho now method under-
took to provide a central controlling machinery for bonking
and to centralize tho reserves by districts; to install a
ban!: noto currency end deposit currency which would be
olastic; to sot up a satisfactory clearing and collection
system by means of the gold settlement fund; and last, to
provide for the doposit of government funds, with certain ex-
ceptions, in the FiLni-JVX RESERVE banks according to the di-
rection of tho Secretary of tho Treasury. To errplain how
this machinery was organized and how it lias functioned and is
now functioning is tho purposo of this th03is»
Immediately after tho passage of tho Act the work of
organizing tho machinery of tho r;: ::::AI RESERVE cystom was sot
in motion. The Act providod that a committee of throe, the
Secretary of the Treasury, tho Secretary of Agriculture, and
the Comptroller of the Treasury, would organiso the system and
then hand it ovor as a working institution to the FEDSBAX
PwKSi:?-VE Board whose care it would be thonceforth.
•i
4The appointment of thio :>oard provided for in the Act,
Tho work of this preliminary organization committee tool:
nine months for there was an immense amount of detail to be
settled. Somo of the most important phases worked out "by
this committee wore those: 1. the division of the country
into the banking districts, S4 the organization of the re-
serve banks in those districts, £• the organisation of the
WKRBIX BKSBRIB Board. In spite of the tremendous burden
on this coramittoo thoir work was done so v;ell that when the
system was taken over by the 7;oard only minor chants had
to bo mado.
The working out of the above mentioned phases follow;
l.Tho division of the country into banking districts*
The work of districting or dividing the country into
twclvo sections, as provide: in the Act, was a difficult
matter, but the decision was finally mado after a careful
survey of i;ho financial, industrial and geographical con-
siderations of nil the competing districts. Tho twelve
named were Boston, Ho:; York, Philadelphia, Cleveland,
Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, nt. Louis, Uinneapolis, Kansas
City, Dallas and San ^raneisco. These cities se mod to be
able financially to OrgBAlst strong banks since the comnorce
and industry of their districts wero large, and thore was
satisfactory transportation within those districts for funds
and discounts. This rogional principle of organization has
i
5(1)
been comnended for its soundness.
2. Organization of the _:oserve Ban'is.
Uext came the organization of the twelve
BB3SB7S banks. Koftk one of these had to have a subscribed
capital of "12,000,000, the stock to be token by the national
banks. £he Act had provided that all national banks must
Join the reserve 37s torn or lose their rights and franchises,
"ach banT: wn.3 to subscribe for $f of it 3 capital and surplus.
The first payment for one-half of the subscription was called
for November 8t 19&4 and the soeond hrJLf for l year later.
As a matter of fact tho second half has never be cn called.
Deside the capital stoch each nomber was to deposit its ro~
servo uith the "PEDERAL HKBBKVg bank in its district. The
amount of the reserve 77ns to be equal to 3;"' of tho member
banjos time do osits and I certain per cent of the demand de-
posits, deptindinv on the location of tho baa'''. This meant
that tho reserve would have to be transferred from their cor-
respondent banks to tho tv/olvo central Dankc, but provision
was made for this transfer to be s : road over three years so
that thero would bo no suddon financial upheaval. Also the
amonnt of the resor^o for eaeh bank was much decreased on ac-
count of the foolin. of safety in having tie reserves com-
binoJ. in the reserve banvs and because of the 1088 of interest
to banks sinco the resorves could no lonfper be U3ed by the
membor banks.
(1)
Dod~o, Chan:;inv the Fundamental structure of the
FTDEP^AI rOSSEkVT: System. Annals of the American Academy,
Sept., 1921. p. 02.

2>. The organisation of the PJ : : SL^'-lVE Board.
Tho next task of the committee MM that or organizing
the central a<~oncy of the system, the FUXrjLT ::j:s::?vV~] Board,
(1)
called by Femmeror the hoystone of the arch of the twelve
?iTDEPAI HSflKHff hanks. There were to "bo seven members in-
cluding the Secretary of the Treasury, who is chairman qtl-
officio, and the Comptroller of the Treasuror. In 1922 an
amendment provide;, for another mombor, ran"!: in g tho present
number eight. Tho members nou serve ten years each, but
th030 of the first board served from tv;o ;o ten years occh.
The choice of members for this first board was a difficult
mattor but it uas considered very satisfactory and 'wisely"
(2)
made. As finally selected by the President and the organ-
isation committee it uas as follows:
Chas. S. Hamlin, -ovornor, a lr.uyer and diplomat
representing llov; England,
tanl n. Warburg, representing .Tall street bankers
and thoir views,
F. A. Delano, Vicc-aovornor, a railroad man from
Chicago,
f« P« Gr. Harding, Prosidont of the national Bank,
Birmingham, Alabama,
A. C« Miller, an economist re resent in.- ; tho j?aci."ic
Coast.
Thefcje wiuh the secretary of the Treasury, ./illiam G. II Adoo,
and John okelton williams, the Comptroller of the Treasury,
organised August 10, 1914.
(1) Xemmoror. Tho A B of the Femoral Reserve System,
P.S4
(2) .alt on and Crorman, Integrity of the ^oderal
Reserve System, Annals of the American Academy, Jan. 19.'22,
p« XV.
(
7At oneo this new board was confronted with the v.. orId
T7ar, and they decided • that they must organise M an emergency
service, 3scnusc of this 77ar condition there IB no doubt
that the subsequent histor;/ of tho 7:D?SJlL 'pt: System is
quite different from v/hat it would have boon without such
interference at tho very be^innin^ of its life.
?ho Board, in order to complete the VMk outlined by
tho organisation committee, called an organisation convention
for October 20, 1914. fhifl convention, composed of the
directors of the now 'INDERAL HRSERTR banks, and others promi-
nent iii banking, net and considered the reports ~.s out?ino ;
by tho preliminary organisation committee for conditions gov-
erning commercial paper and rediscount ins, national and local
clearings, or-aninations, reports, and publication of state-
ment s, and tho draft in;; of by-laws. Details necessary for
carrying out tho plans wore completed by the convention and
a date set for the opening, Ilovombor SO, 193.4. 2ho last part
of this organisation period is concerned with tho actual open-
ing of tho banl:s. A bank bccr.ne identified with the system
by paying for its stock in tho FBPiiAI .:v.vy:r. bank as called
for llovonber 2, 19X4 and pay in;; in its re servo two weeks
later, Hovembor 1G. ffcll diy, not tho thirtieth as planned,
was the day on which the TO HBRAX RBflKKfl banks officially
opened. 11ho Board had provionsly recnested that the re-
servos should bo palA in cold in so far M possible so that
thoro would be a sizable -old reserve fund at he ouLset.
c€
i
ewhen all was paid in it was fonnd that 87;' of tho '265,000,000
paid in was in cold.
The system was now in operation and it was most gratify-
ing to those interested for thoro had "boon ranch critic isra, op-
position and discouragemont. One favorable circumstance at
the time of opening was that tho raonoy market was easy, for
there was so little importing and exporting on account of the
European ar and also little demand hero for loans. This
may account for the fact that business was not disturbed in
spite of the great change that had ta^en place when tho Re-
serve system began to function, Thus ended tho first period
of the PE EPiA! RESERVE system, a poriod in which the construct-
ive work of organization was of such outstanding value.
At this timo it may bo well to see what tho fooling in
genoral was both inside and outside of the FEDERAL RESERVE
system, and so lay a foundation to understand later develop-
ments in tho syotom. In tho early stages of the system, the
President of tho Unitod States, although roally responsible
for it and intensely interested in it, believed that he should
keep aloof from tho Board so that it would bo free to act with
as little red tape as possible "horoforo he communicated
with the 3oard through tho Secretary of tho Treasury instead
of directly. This was unsatisfactory from tho beginning and
decidedly unpleasant later on. The relations between the
Oomptroiler of tho Treasury and the .ioard also were unsatis-
factory. Thoro was an understanding that tho system was to
bo kept out of politics, but the Comptroller, a political
appointee not in accord with the 3oard, could interfere with
\*
9its work and oven hinder it, he did when ho refused to -Ivo
the Board results of the examinations of the banks, those ex-
aminations being made by him in accordance with powers givon
(1)
him, and also other information of importance to tho Board,
Another body strongly opposed to the system was the
(2)
banking profession of tho country. Prom the beginning they
had been vory unfriondly; sorao even 3aid that thoy would re-
fuse to do business with tho l.osorvo banks. :von aftor tho
oponing of tho banks tho relations between tho Board and the
member banks, and between tho Reserve banks and tho members
were not ideal. Tho opposition was making a constant effort
to have the law modifiod in somo way. Therefore it was re-
markable that tho institution got undor way, in spite of cueh
powerful obstacles, and that on tho whole tho provisions of
tho Act had been oar.ied out quite c.'Toct ivoly. ^erhaos the
opposition helped more than it hindored.
Tho second period which may bo colled the period of ex-
perimentation will be considered In req-ard to tho working out
of the regulations made by tho rXXBBAX RE Slip.VE Board for tho
oporation of the banks. The most Important of those are as
follows:
1. Tho note issue.
2. Rediscount ing, discount ratos and qualifications of
commercial papor.
5. Tho gold settlement fund and clearances.
4. State banl^: membership.
5. Foreign Ilxchango.
G. Opon market operations.
(1)
illis, The Federal koserve System, p. 795
(2)
Gov.Bonj. Strong, in Preface to Tho A B C of tho
Federal Reserve systom, p.V.
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The note issue.
The currency situation in the United States had often
boon unsatisfactory in that at certain tines there would be
on over supply of currency and at other times a great shortage,
especially in the autumn when the need is always great on ac-
count of the moving of crops and manufacture .1 goods. Jhe
FEJERAL RESERVE System was designed to help this situation by
providing for extra currency whon neoded and retiring the extra
amount whon no longer neoded. ^his would give the rtelastic
currency" which adapts itsolf to the needs of business and the
(1)
community. Tho throe kinds of currency now available are
these:
1. Hational bank notos issued by national banks without
any intervention of the f;~,::ral x: 3oard.
2. FEDERAL RESERVE bank notes issued by the FEDERAL
::::s:i:v:: banks without special permission of tho
FKDSBil RESERVE Board.
/ S. FEDERAL RESERVE notos issued by permission of tho
FEDERAL HESERVE Board through tho federal reserve
agent.
national bank notos may bo itOloA by each national bank
in valuo equal to its paid in capital. -^hose aro iosued
against United States bonds deposited with the Tronsuror of
the United otatos up to tho par value of tho note lBBOf, and
a 5, redemption fund deposited with its Reserve ban}:. To
issue notes a national bank buys in the open market United
States bonds equal to tho amount of notes desired and these
are sent by tho bank to tho Comptroller of tho Treasury.
(1)
V.
fillis and Stoiner, Federal Preserve 73an!-:lng
Practice, p. 71

II
FEJERAL nr.SKIVE bank notes arc issued in a similar way,
"bonds bein$ deposited with the Comptroller of tho Treasury,
and tho FEDERAL RE32RVTS notes are seat to the banks by the
Comptroiler. The latter is responsible for the making,
shipping, return and destruction of these notes. Thero
are very few of these in circulation at present, although the
volume was lar^e during and immediately after the war.
The most important of all are the FE ERA! RESERVE notes,
which wore intended to supcrscdo the old national bank notes.
It is u^on these FEDERAL RESERVE notes that the hank note
(1)
elasticity depends. Those notes are isrued to tho FEDERAL
RESERVE banks or to members by application to the FEDERAL
RESERVE a^ont. The a^cnt applios for the notes to tho
Comptroller, rocoives them, transfers them to the FEDERAL
RESERVE bank on receiving collateral of cold f°r them. For
tho redemption of those, each FSKSRAI RESERVE bank has a 5
'
fund deposited with the Troasuror of tho United States.
V/hon he receives the notes, ho redooms thorn from this fund,
and the Reserve bank has to replenish tho fund by means of the
jold settlement fund which will bo tat] lained in detail later.
Rediscount lng, discount rates and ual ificatlons of oogggrg ial
^apor.
One of tho jroat advantages of the FEDERAL EESE tVB ay stem
was the opportunity it provided to member banks to obtain re-
discounts at tho Reserve banks. L'enber banks needing funds
and holding eligible paper could offer this to the Reserve
banks and so obtain fund3—an idoa frowned upon by bankers and
(1)
Zommoror, the ABC of tho Roderal Reserve Gyirtom, ,,.53
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business men nndcr the old banking system, Tho FEDERAL
HBSBBVE Act laid down General principles concerning thi3
rediscount ing but left to the Board the details necessary
to define the scope, limitations, and eligibility of paper,
and the fixing of ratos. The Act theoretically held that
a uniform rate was not practical or desirable in a country
tho size of this whore industrial conditions vary so tproatly
and where snpply and demand for capital fluctuate so much.
Therefore tho Board roquested the Mesorve banks to recommend
rates for the various clossos of tho paper. Tho su, posted
rates were all very hif;h sinco many or? tho :;esorvo bank of-
ficials feared that they would not make money unless tho rate
was h'njh, not roalizin^ that the function of tho Reserve
(1)
banks is not profit but service. Finally after much discuss-
ion tho decision was for varying rates throughout tho country
from 4Jv "to g,.'. All :al v:: bani:s have to file with
the Board weekly their discount rntos. Therefore not only
was there a £_eat advantage in rediscount inc, but also there
was that of the establishment of a definite rate throughout
each district, available to all bank3 on the same conditions.
(2 )
The best result of this appeared in the standardising of all
city bank rates according to tho ..osorve bank rate of each
city, so oivin^ banks a basi3 of comparison—an i.oa novor
before possible of fulf illraont. Prom the point of view of
(1)
Hanson, Tho Ye .oral r.oserve under fire a, ain,
Independent, Doc. 1Z, 1924. p. 527
(2)
Willie, Federal Reserve System, p. 1035
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the "business man it was an advantage too, for anything which
lowers the rates a bank has to pay tend3 to reduce the rates
it can charge, and thus the customer goto the "benefit of good
rates.
Hie first rates as fine a "by the Board were very simple
and made practically no classification, except as paper was
for 50, 60, or 90 days, the rates "being graded according to
maturity. But as time went on, it was found necessary to
have a regular structure, since ratos were affected as to
single or double name paper, and also beeauso of the prefer-
ential rates on bankers 1 acceptances. Therefore by the ond
of 1916 tho system had thirteen different ratos.
The theory underlying tho rediscount policy is very
closoly allied with that of tho eligibility of commercial
paper. The FEEERAI BB8SRT1 system is by the PEDEKAI HSSBKttg
Act a centralised regional banking systom designod to coordi-
nato the work of tho individual "banks through the reserves,
and since tho .;osorve banks hold tho gold reserves of tho
members, they must make crodit available to tho members.
But as tho FTDIIIAL lu^l'iVi: banks have only thomselves to dc-
pond on, they must koep their roscrves liquid constantly to
meet any demand which may como. Fox this reason they can
take only that paper which represents liquid transactions.
Therefore definite regulations concerning the eligibility of
paper for discount wore nococsary.
In general tho most liquid paper is that of short
maturity at the time of discount. This kind of commercial

14
paper alone is adapted to the needs of the frlMlfrlng system,
and it is only through the use of such paper that a satis-
factory basis for the operation of the system could he es-
(1)
tablished. Thi3 principle of liquidity is a fundamental
one of the system and has "been the subject of much contro-
versy in Congress. The 9K2BBAX HESEEV33 system is essentially
a commercial frfnlrfnc system bearing no direct relation to in-
vestment banking and so confines itself to this type of paper,
at loast theoretically. Uso of such paper results in tho
automatic adaptation of the volume of credit to the neod3 of
the community, making the necessaiy contraction and expansion,
and so keeping the proper balance with the result that exten-
sion of credit does not raise prices. The Board realised
that better banking methods deraande" emphasis on the highest
grade of commercial paper since the purpose of the commercial
banking system is to aid commerce and apiculture, not the
money interests of the country* Eha regulations of 1915 ex-
plicitly stated that the proceod3 of eligible papor xiqyq to
be used only in connection with production, manufacture and
distribution of good3, and not for permanent or speculative
(2)
investments, emphasizing according to J. T. Iloldsworth tho
function of tho system, ''not to provide capital and facilities
for investment or speculative purposes, but to liquify and
(1)
Dodge, Changing the fundamental Structure of the
Federal System, Annal3 of the American Academy,Sept.l921,p.78
(2)
Holdsworth, Money and Banking, 1929. p. 487
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equalise the supply of funds employed in commercial, in-
dustrial and agricultural operations. ' nr. Hol&Stfortfc
adds, "To supply funds for longtime investments is the
function of financial, not commercial tanking*"
That the influence of the r.eservo system is very
pov.orful today on membor hr.nl:s and non-members too on the
standards of credit prevailing in tho United States is due
to this very omphasis. Since member "bonks must have paper
acceptable to the TZDrfAL RESERVE banks for rediscount Ins,
they, tho member banks, p>ass on to their customers the same
(1)
requirements, and since such paper carries the lowest rates,
the whole business world is directly affected and influenced
thoroby.
.
Tho forms of commercial paper eligible Tor rediscount
are promissory notos, drafts and bills of exchange, tr^do
accoptancoB and bankers 1 acceptances. These the ;.oscrve
banks will rediscount if thoy are endorsed by member banks
and conform to the rules as amende A in 19*34. Tho letter
make the test3 of olijibility dependent on
1» Time of maturity, not over 90 days from the dato
of discount, except for agricultural purposes,
when it may be nine montha.
2. Tho use of the proceeds, which ttuflft be Tor buying
or marketing poods, or for trading in United
States sccu-itios.
£• The proceeds not being loaned to other borrowers.
Tho above classes occlude alJ demand pa^er and arrival
fl)
7/illis & "tciner, "Federal Reserve Banking
practice, p. 14&*
4
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drafts oxeept those covering domestic shipments of agricultu-
ral staplos. Emergency war amendments did provide for di-
rect advancos to members "by the r.oserve banks on promissory
secured notes of not over fi.'tcen days, and also for the dis-
counting of member bank obligations if secureu by ,/ar I'inance
Corporation bonds. raeso measures proved to be a groat aid
to the government in war financing efter the United States
entored the world «7ar«
Another matter of importance to be settled in this con-
nection concerned the information which nembor banks had to
furnish to the Reserve "banks to vouch for the eligibility and
acceptable quality of the papor offered. The first ruling
was that from January 16, 1015, all eligible paper would have
to be accompanied by a strte^iont of the financial condition of
the borrower from the member hank, 2his however was not to
the liking of the member banks, and as a result the reserve
(1)
banks were not doing a& much of this business as might be ex-
(2)
pected. Conne uently a now re ulation was made in 1024 and
is still in effect. This said that the ?r IPJVI ;:?.s:::iVE
banks "may in all cases rer
:
u\. e the financial statement of the
borrower to be filed. Ten of tho reserve banks (Cleveland
and 3an rrancisco excepted) recommend special forms for tho
Balance Choot and rofit and Lose Statement of borrowers.
Regulations for tho use of promissory notes, drafts and
bills of exchange cpv.so. li'jtlo difficulty, but those for the
(1)
Holdsworth, Honey and ranking, p. 407
(2)
V/illi3 and steiner, rederal reserve Banking
rractice, p. 101
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third cla38 of commorcial paper, trade acceptances, which were
a now feature in the United States, caused much discussion,
A trade acceptance is defined by the deserve Board as a "bill
of exchange drawn by the seller on the purchaser of the goods
sold and acceptod by such purchaser." As a trade acceptance
was drawn to liquidate a bona fide transaction, it was con-
sidered choice paper and was £iven a lower discount rate.
Thorefore it was a special inducement to business men becruso
of the rate and also because there was no limit to the amount
of acceptances which could be discounted.
Ihc history of the trade acceptance in its early years
was rather a storm;' one, for rftcr it had been in use for
three years, 1014 to 1017, It VB.fi shown that there was much
abuse of it. It wr.s not bcin~ used as planned at first, but
was employed as a means of collecting overdue accounts and
thereby lengthenlnc the crc It term instord of shorten inc it.
After the war much attention was directed toward this abuse
and gradually it was corrected. The tendency in its use now
is In tho special fields for which it is adapted with a much
more limited use than was at first planned. Hanufacturcrs
are the principal users of the trade acceptance now. The
(1)
r.o servo Board was blamed for tho abuse of tho use of the
trado acceptance because they, after realizing the misuse,
continued tho preferential rata of discount and the proimnanda
for tho movement. However Willi a change of membership in the
(1)
'Villis, Th.4 Federal :;osorve System, p« 9B6
«
le
3oard, correction of those doings bo^^an, and nor/ the trade
acceptance is one of the advantageous units of the Reserve
system.
TJp to 1915 there had been a lack of bankers 1 aoccpt-
(1)
ancee in the United States, although the;/ had been widely
used in Great Britain. This lack in the United StM.es the
Reserve Act sought to correct. A banker's acceptance iu a
draft accoptod by a bank which would otherwise bo acf.o, t;cd
by a business man. By the reserve Act the use of the
bankers 1 acceptances was limited to foreign trade, but thie
has since boon ar:ondcd to include the financing of domestic
shipments. Because tho bankorrj 1 acceptances carry a low
rate of d soount, they have to be used carefully in order
not to injure the business and credit foundation* HH
i:ouorvo Roard at first proceeded slowly with these accept*
one es in order to avoid mistakes. As the years went on,
thoro was, as with trade acceptances, cntensivo abuse of the
bankers' acceptances in Iho market. In 1916 when they were
carrying the low raLc of 2-lv'j, many people were anxious to
have them used for lon$ timo commercial tr .-.-nsactionu, taufl
raakina them into accommodation paper. liy 1L1V w;:en the
United states was feeling the financial ef:7oct3 of the war
and money rates were tllif<1llg. many concerns wore finanolfl
themselvos by moans of who bankers • acceptances, i. o.
,
uy
lone torm renewal notes which carried interest lower thar, in
(1)
ivillis and stoinor, federal Reserve Banking
practice, p. 465.
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the money market. Barly in 1918 the Board in a letter to
tho Reserve hanks urged them to cor: ect some of the worst
features of existing conditions, but the "banks paid little
heed to this request and did practically nothing. All the
elements of safety and protection as had been planned for
in tho use of those acceptances had beon sacrificed. This
continuod after tho United States entered the World .,ar,
and even for some years after the war finished, tho practice
of using them for refinancing projects as well as for long
terra credit was kept up.
finally in 1922 the whole question of oversight of
acceptances was transferred by the Board to the deserve banks
locally. Again it was a case of the Board sacrificing somo
of its paver to the Reserve banks unnecessarily. Even under
tho supervision of the "banks, tho practice did not show much
improvement immediately, but later the raattors of reconstruct-
ion abroad and reparations proved to bo of g. eat help to the
acceptance situation. It was found that tho acceptances could
bo uso^ to finance trade with aormany, and thereupon a new reg-
ulation was mado giving back to the Board tho power of govern-
ing acoeptanco practice. It stands thU3 at present. deal-
ings in bankers* acceptances now form one of the most important
phases of Bosorvo ban!: business. _?hcoe operations in accept-
(1)
ancos, according to Moldsworth, are of groat advantage in
bringing the systom into contact with other "portions of tho
market 1 bosido tho member banks.
(1)
Holdsworth, Iloncy and Banking, p« 15
«
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ThoBe in gonoral were tho main rovulations dealing with
commercial paper. On the wholo they had a good effect on the
public and on the banking situation too in standardizing and
defining exactly tho various kinds of eligible paper. The
efforts of tho deserve banks to have tho other banks cooperate
in regard to the form of paper were the first organised at-
tempts to unify banking practice and action and marked a for-
ward step in providing a basis of credit on a recognised and
established foundation.
The Gold Settlement ^nnd and Clearances .
Another important and difficult problem confronting the
F27;E?JVL :-*ES23VE Board was the provision for clearances and
transfers according to Section 13 of the Act which granted to
the Board the power to act as a cloaring house for the Reserve
banks or to designate some Reserve bank so to act. The Board
wished to havo the collection system established and to have
each Reserve bank act as a cloarin-- houso so that the Reserve
(1)
systom might "attain full stature or succeed in getting a reg-
ular flow of business to and from its member banks.'' This
plan would keep tho koscrvo banks steadily on^ed by a re u-
lar flow in and out of their vaults so that the reserve bal-
ances would bo of use and not a fund for emergency only. The
Board decided to take over tho work itself, and to provide
for tho two kinds of clearing called for in the Act, local or
district, and intordlstrict or national. There was much oppo-
sition by tho bankers of tho country to tho par collection idea
(1)
;;illis, The rodoral Reserve System, p. 1053
*
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for tho city banks foared the loss of the country banks 1 "bus-
iness, and tho country banks !oiew that thoy would lose much
fl)
of their earnings from exchange, or as Dodge phrased it, the
bankers uould lose their "petty graft". Still others claimed
that tho older clearing houses v/ould be forced out of business
if this plan were to go through.
However in si-ite of all this opposition the beginning
was made. The machinery for tho intcrdi strict or national
collecting and transferring started with tho establishment of
a Gold settlement ^und and a pr.I.^l/LL PJ:.x:::YE Agent's rand.
For those the Board ordered each l.oserve ban!: to send to the
nearest sub-treasury ono million dollars in fold or gold cer-
tificates for credit to an account called tho Cold Settlement
Pund, and also an additional amount e :ual to its indebtedness
to all tho FEDERAL RESERVE banks for tho FEDERAL RESERVE
Agent's ^und. Whilo the minimum amount for each bank is one
million dollars in tho lold Settlement vund, yet all of tho
banks usually carry much larger amounts in the fund, for credit
on the books of tho Cold Settlement "und counts as part of any
bank's logal rosorve. ?ho purpose of those tv;o funds was to
abolish tho sendin of currency ovor the country as had been
nocessary before for sottling tilt indebtedness between banks.
This would not have to continue since all adjustments of bal-
ances between the EPJV1 _-: .7/, wanks were to bo made through
telegraphic communication and adjustment of the gold reserve
(1)
Dodge, Taking banking out of politics. Independent,
Dec. 11, 1020, p.256
1
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fund. Each br.nk was to t olograph to the Board the amount
of its indebtedness to other banks, and tho transfers of
debits and credits would be mado on tho books of the Gold
Sett1 orient Fund.
'.'his clearing systom began on July 5, 1916 on a weekly
basis in the twelve BB3SHVS districts. F.ach bank
telegraphed to '.Tashington on ,/odncsday tho amount due through
the FjID^HAI lyi-lXl'-.T/. banks, and on Thursday morning the net
amount was found for oaoh ban!:. 2hio alterod tho ownership
of the Gold ^und weekly and statements showing the now con-
ditions wore sont to tho banks. This was found quite satis-
factory for the first years, but it was decided that it would
bo possible and noro satisfactory to have the clearing on a
daily basi3, and this practice was started in 1918*
As to local or district collecting and clearing, the
plan wao for each FFd)FPAl iC;.:. v: banl: to act in its own dis-
trict as a clearing house for member banks and qualified non-
momber banks called 'clear in.- morajcr banks '. From these
banke tho HI-IAl .Jkj.T.VS banks nov/ receive at r.ar ''checks
drawn on all members and clcarin; member br.nks and other non-
mombor banks which agree to remit at par through the F^DFEAL
RESERVE bank of the district.'' They also do the sane con-
cerning checks received from outside the district. Thus tho
par clearing and collection system has boon established
tliroughout the United States.
fl)
Xonmorer, ?ho A B C of the Federal F.oserve, p. 71
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State Dank Membership
.
nest carao the problom of state bank membership. 3y
the tonus of the Reserve Act national ban" :c had to become
members of the Reserve system, but provision Tor the admis-
sion of state banks uas delegated to the g.oservc pjoard.
2his involved a vast amount of detail to be settled, and as
a result dofinito regulations 7/02*0 not completed until June,
1915. In the meantime many stato banks had applie . for ad-
mission to the system, but by the time that the regulations
uore ready, many had withdrawn their applications. 3y the
end of 1915 only thirty-two state banks were in the system,
but during the next three years there uas a grojt change.
This uas due first to the adoption of certain amendments con-
cerning stato banks' membership uhich were more pleasing to
thoso banks, socondly to certain changes in stato banking
laws uhich benefited state banks going into the- g.oserve
system and also improved the feeling bctwoon the state banks
and the fodoral government, thirdly because of the change of
fooling that tho state banks' officers underwent when they
saw that tho strong banks uore bocoming allied with the
P.eserve system. Commenting on tho inducements offorod the
(1)
3tate banks by the amendments of 1117, "oldsworth says,
ff!Tho removal of theso obstacles coming at a time when pat-
riotic desire to assist tho government in financing the war
resulted in a marked increase in state ban!: membership. '
(1)
Holdsuorth, Honey and banking, p. 548
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V/ith the admission of stato banks MM ttw quest ion 01
the Board's power of limiting tho number of branches to "bo
established "by tho stato institutions. Phis will bo dealt
with more fully later.
Foreign "'.sehan^e .
She |S 2ERAX RESERVE Act provided for tho creation if
branches of member banhs abroad and also f or tho establishment
of agencies of the FEDERAL RESERVE baahs abroad. Ilony de-
tails for the working out of those two provisions were made by
the Board. Thoro are nor; many branches of tho national banks
functioning well in European countries, and the great advan-
tage of their existence is that they can finance our foreign
trade instead of our having to depend on European banhs for
necessary accommodations.
Or»en Marhot Operations.
f~ B mm 1 • ^ i m~ — ^- m mm m
Section 14 of the KDTFAL :::::.:.V"?: Act providod that the
PE3ERAI RE3ESVE banks might buy in the op on market paper el-
igible for rediscount. All Wat include: so that tho public
would be benefited, for theso transactions would entrantee a
considerable businoss botwoen tho P.esorve banks and the public
in general without tho intervention of any of the neabtT banks.
This had to be done if the Reserve banks were to make their
discount rates influential in c:-tenaing rates similar to those
which they were chrrging. This provision is ono of the most
important soctions of the Act in that it furnishes means by
which the P.esorve system may deal with others beside ban in;
customers, and because of this it t| one of the most criticised
V
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fl)
sections of tho Reserve Act.
The reflations of the Board Ppplitd this -/ower of the
open market operation to tho following transact ions
•
1. Buying and celling of cable transfers, bankers*
acceptances, and bills of >wrohangi clijible for
roaiceo tint 9
2. Buying and selling of bonds and notes of the
United States.
Deal in: in ;old coin.
During tho first year the transactions coming under
this class were confined mostly to country banks which wero
in more or loss difficult circumstances. This Vao bcoauso
the member banks in ,-oneral "ore hostile to tho idea, for
thoy felt that the Reserve banks would compote with thorn for
the trade of the country bank3 and would take some of this
trade from then. Therefore it was an exception for the
larger banks to deal with tho ke servo b; n s.
However one very cood result of the first year's trial
in this fiold was that there were very few ban!: failures that
year. This was a creat contrast to tbl usual laivc number of
failures, and was an auspicious pircumatrree for open market
operations. Durin g tho following years there was a steady in-
crease in those open market operations, and the general situa-
tion showed that that ^articular provision of tho Act was one
of the most needed for the gpfd of the public, and os.. ocially
for the system so that it could control in lar^o degree the
fl]
Hanson, Peroral Reserve under r.iro A rain. Independent,
Doc. 1L, 1924, p. 527 and kditorial Ration, llov.15,1929, p.659
c
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(1
cro .It conditions and their effect on the business world.
Uueh time had "boon require a for the consumption of
tho plans and reflations of the FllDZRAL IZlixl'.'.YZ Board con-
cerning those phases that have been dealt with, end it was
close to tho end of 1916 before the majority of the refla-
tions were in worI-:in~ order. Thus ended the period of ex-
perimentation, A period in which tho system, by slow
(2)
staf s of progress found itself." It was not tho end of
all experiments since It was understood that certain points
ff)
would be clearer after functioning, when according to
L. i£. icrson, ''polich and perfection would cone ;t ,
How that the forego lug account has troato I %t the or-
ganisation of the fRDEBAI RESERVE systom and of the estab-
lishment of ;;omc of the most important reflations for the
wor^in^; of tho system, tho way is prepared for a study of
tho policies of the .oscrvo Loard, i. o., the working out o:
tho ideas onbodiod In tho Act as aff c.ctinft tho fod of the
country and in acco u with the purposes for which it was
frar.od.
ID
3ee Pag9fl 54 and 58
(2) aov. Bt&J« Young, preface to A B C of the
Podoral Reserve, p. VI.
(3)
Piorson, Ucirhin^ the re .eral l.ecerve,
3an]:ors l T Ta^azine, July, 1025, p. 70
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These policies nay bo divided into throe large periods 1
1* Those of the formative period ending with. 1022,
2. Those of tho period of normality, 1022 through 19.cj7,
5« Those of the period of recent developments, 1928
and 1929.
In the first or formativo period, with the "beginning
of the Reserve system almost contemporaneous with tho out-
break of tho V/orld ar, everything; was so closely linked
with tho war either directly or indirectly that we shall con-
sider tho period in two parts: the first, tho policies of the
war time years up to 1919; and the socond, those policies
which wero the aftor effects of tho war during tho years
1919-1922.
(1)
Tho ?:3.:/.a:. 7". system, as v.'illis tolls us, really
developed as a result of war financing and became what it did
because of the conso uoncos of this financing. That its
history during the first oi;ht years of it;-; lifo is the
story of war finane o and war backing is the .eason not only
for its success but also for tho success of policies and
methods which under ordinary circumstances probably wo old not
have been attompted. Tho United States was called upon to
bear a tremendous burden during the war time, and had it not
been for the existence and functioning of the ::eoervo system,
this country would never have been able to finance tho immense
war transactions which were so vital in tho winning of the war.
(1)
Willie, Federal ..osorve System, p« 1D25
(
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On the other hand tho war did offer to the Reserve system
the chance to prove what it could do, hat it did entirely
change the preconceived plan and is the main cause for the
aft or effects whether ^ood or evil*
The indirect effects of the '7orId 7ar before the en-
trance of the United States into it have already "been
touched irpon, hut with the prospect of tho United States be-
coming one of the activo allies, the FKDERAL HESEHVE Board
early in 1C17 be~:n to ma>e preparations for v;hat would have
to he done for the fInane in;- of the war. The first step was
to plan for u Itrga apply of tv. iruL :rri::rv7: notes which
would he on hand to ho use ,1 in an emergency. This could ho
dono since the re servo 3 of tho banks \7oro lar.;e, and there
was also a lr,;-o supply of cold in tho vaults and that was
boinr; prtfffllly increased, The federal notos reforrcd to
wore distributed by the Board to all tho mints and sub-treaa-
urios of the country, and all the momber banks wero put on a
war basis by tho Board, since tho rillF/ZLAI nr.sr.RVE banks wore
in a strong position and could direct the action they con-
sidered ho3t. The r.esorvo authoritios in looking ahead do-
cidod that it wa3 a fitting tine to increase tho rigidity of
tho bank examinations and of supervision so that everything
Might be in the beat possiblo situation for whatever would he
needed.
Although oondit ions concerning the l.c servo banks at the
openinr of tho war were so fnvorablo, those of tho Treasury
department wero uito tho opposite, bcin
;
decidedly weak.
c
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This condition came about "because of the large supply of non-
liquid assets held by the Treasury* Jueh a condition would
not have existed at this crucial period if all or thf pro-
visions of the PS EHAI RESBRYK Act could have "been enforced
unreservedly by the Board, for oho section of the Act which
provided that all UOimilMftlil funds should be transferred to
the ::osorve system and that the Ac servo banhs should act as
fiscal agents for the $ovornmcnt was designed to moot such an
omorjoncy. Ih« Ragarve 3oard had been forced to modify that
provision '.Then they found that they were in conflict with the
^acretary of the treasury, HhO was much opposed to the idea.
Ho fox? that the system beina; still in tho beginning sta o was
not yet competent to bo trusted with the handling of govern-
ment funds or with tho responsibility of the duties of fiscal
afronts.
That such conditions did exist seems to bo due to the
laci: of vision of tho Treasury officials. If these in charge
had been broad visione<: men, Shay would have realised the im-
portance ana necessity of the development of tho fiscal ma-
(1)
chinery of tho . o servo system in its oarlj days and would
doubtloos have cooperated with Lao J;card in hrlnr.ina; this about.
Braa with the declaration of war imminent, tho Treasury depart-
ment continued to ignore the reserve Board, but nevertheless,
expected the Hoard to stand "by ana" be ready to assist at a
moment 1 s not ic o
.
fX]
illis, federal Baaarre System, ... 1112
r
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An example of this was Given when on .'larch 51, 1917, the
Treasury department without any previous warning informed
the Reserve Board that the Secretary of the Jroasury wished
the Reserve system to Met over the floating of a certificate
indebtedness of (50j GOG, COO. These certificates, short tirao
government loans, were issued in anticipation of liberty
loans, and were favored by the treasury because they "brought
funds in promptly* Tho Koserve banks did their part and
took up the whole of this small issue, Jho launching of the
issue brought with it much criticism concerning this method of
raising funds, the economists maintaining that there should
not bo any moro of the cortificato issues .,u j \,h< n .od
funds should come from taxation and popular leans. Their
views however did noL prevail, and cert if Loato isauos ojn-
(1)
tinned, amounting to A billion dollars by Jrr.: , 1U21. The
handling of tho sales of these certifier. tec of indebtedness by
the .esorvo banks impressed tho officials of tho Treasury and
the latter were then willing to recogglftt RtfA cooperate with
tho 3oard.
The discussion concerning certificate i::;u.js finally
culminated in a very important decision. Thi3 provided that
tho certificates should be funded into an issue of bonds at
with a maximum of g7,0GG,0G0,GGv. . This decision was far
roaching in its effects a3 it proved to be the basis of the
war financing system and a method mest satisfactory to but
ttj
Zemmorer, The A u o of the federal ..e servo System,
p. ^
(
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Secretary of the Treasury, who wished to have the bonds at-
tl)
tractive to the public.
Thinking that a great advantage would accrue from
leaving gteraniit funds Li the banks, the Treasury offi-
cials decided to leave the Treasury funds on deposit in
those banks which subscribed directly foi the bonds or in-
diroctly for them throu:ii their customers. Thus all bantot
might become depositories of ^ovornmont funds and this would
leave the I.escrve banks free to act as district and collect-
in^ ar-oneio3. The latter would then bo acting in accordance
(2)
with the plan of the -.csorvo Act, and would be, as :i. . .illis
said, "truly fulfillinc their functions as fiscal agents.''
When the Treasury department made this arrangement, thereby
recognising the P.csorve bank 3 a3 fiscal agents, they knew well
that all the banks of the country would soon be ap rly£ag to the
Reserve banks for rediscounts that they mi.jht pay for their
sub script ions. The Treasury officials kaH riiso that uhey
would bo relieved of a ^reat burden if the :.e servo banks would
take over all the detail work connected with the collection of
the subscriptions to the loans and tho paying for che hu
:
;e
amounts of war supplies, all of Which could be done most suc-
cessfully by means of the Gold Settlement Pund. As a conse-
quence of this Arrangement, the old sub-treasury system lost
its standing and its functions since the use of the Gold Set-
tlement Fund for the transfor of funds and the adoption of
(1) Changing tho J'undamental structure of the " c oral
l:o serve Systom, Ajnnals of the American .Academy, C>c;nt. 1921, p. 79
(2} Villi::, Federal Preserve System, p. 1119
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paymont by cred : t, instead of by specie, had shown thl ^Teat
advantage of this mothod,
With the public announcement of the 7-irst Liberty loan
cene a test of the policies of the FI^ITLAL ICSSSHU Board,
The Treasury department impressed on the Board the importance
of the success of this attempt which was to bo the first war
tesj of the credit obtaining power of the United states,
2o secure the cooperation oi all the banks in the country,
(only ono-third of the total number belonged to the Reserve
system at this timo,, the Board announced that the Reserve
banks would discount for any Lank whatever notes it would
present if they were collateralied by government bonds and
brought in through a member bank. Chorefore all banks could
rediscount thl paper which they were raking for the purchase
of tiltjf bonds of the Pirst Liberty Loan, and each bank would
be much more interested in rjottinj individuals to assist, so
that all the people all over tho country v/ould it their part,
'fho result of this stop, ; :.s we all* well know was most ^ratify-
ir»C« r2o the r.eservc authorities it was a surprise that so
little demand wts made on the resources of the Reserve banks,
since the former hed expecto; the member banks 7;;)uld need
much assistance fron the ke servo banks. In the estimation of
the rreaBury officials, the success of the loan redounded to
the credit of the <...AL ir.il. ;V~: system ana jhe:«.e was a con-
fident feeling that the system eor.id be reiied on for greater
loans in tho future.
Willis—Federal Reserve System, p. 1183
Roforring to the dual relationship of tho treasury and the
(1)
l.eserve Board Holdsworth says it "Wit of inest Imable value
during the period of war financing at this tins. Indeed
it may be said that IVT&Ag that period the;?- fthi /esorve
3oard ) were the satellites of the Treasury* TT
During the months following this -vre-it t^st of the
Reserve ay aten several amendment e to the FEI32RAL BESKKVE Act
wore proposed and carried. One of these provided for a
large increase of the r.csorvo hsnli funds so that the credit
HIMilan poser of the system night be much larger I-hen he-
fore, and also for tho Granting of extreme power to the
Reserve system. Valla thr.se twe provisions v/ere very nuch
needed during tho war period for tho continued success?al
working of the synten, there was much discussion concerning
•ihese later. fhe first provision was hold ::esp ^nsihle for
the credit inflation which followed, while the unuos.tr. .hie
feature of the other was that fht Board, having ho on given
extraordinary power ia an HITglilitJj did not '..iter seek a
modification of t.-ose extreme powarai Therefore, tho toard
was hlamed for keeping the system That it wa3 in v/ar t.ime-
T
a war emergency ays torn with enormous power^knd unused ao-
thorlty'7 -insocuii of ma:. in;; it a banking system ahle to con-
trol finance through economic and financial mea .s rsth r than
through political power.
To continue, tho Reserve ayeten had now assumed a new
(1)
II olu:y,;orth, Honey and Banking, p. 540
c1
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status, being rospcctod "by banhers and the pcneral public and
l)einn accepted by the Treasury department as or important war
(1)
auxiliary* One very important service of the Reserve barifcs
was their advr.aclny Of money to tho rovornment as often happen-
ed when the government account was found te be short* Then
the r.c serve bai&e would tide over thn short n.yc by temporary
loans. The larger State DSl&S had by this tine come into the
system and this added to its prestipe , While the fcelirp- of
unity brought about by the war was i distinct advrrt- e. All
these influences wore exerting tremendous /over with results
that were both pood ?.nd bad. To sum up the bad offoots #•
have the following! !• the overdopendonco of the treasury de-
partment on the P.c3erve system for financing the war, 2. the
tenderer to _.aos ov:r tho Pescrvo ideas of prompt maturity rind
redemption since government paperm taking the place of com-
mercial paper in the banks, and 3. the lowering of the ctrict
standards of the early years of the system. !Tcrev~r, even
if the latter were true, y:t somethin hro bar .-a! nod, since
banhlng ^racticc, as carrlod on by the Pe serve system, was
still on a higher plane than that of banhfl in general.
Another feature of ruostienable value took shape at this
tine In the building up of the tfHJEKAt ?:^"PTr. ban!-: of row Yorh
as a central brnl. . -This was the ides of the Eroesury depart-
ment since they ooneidared it would facilitate matters to have
a central bank to which orders would bo .pivon and from which
those ordor3 would c° to others. naturally the ITew Yorh bank
(1)
Kemmcror, Tho A 13 C of the Federal Peserve System, p. 97
/
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was the one to "be soloctcd, not only on account of its location
and resources, but al30 because of the presence in Hew York City
of fiscal ajonts from thoso countries which wore concernod in
the financing of the war transactions. Thus did the Treasury
department oentralizc the How York bank and ma!:© it "the govern-
ment's own bank. TT(^ The bank was strong boforo this tool: place,
but with tho protection of the Secretary of the Treasury and the
approval of some members of the ::oserve Board, it became so stron
(1)
that it could oven defy tho Board when it so wished. This
denouement was not the result of tho policy of the Reserve Board,
and for that the Board must be held blameless. That one bank of
the system would over become so powerful was something entirely
unfoiaseen and wholly brought about by the war. This happening
has been called the groato3t possible injury to tho plan as
(2)
originally worked out,
Ab tho war continued and the enormous estimates for war
financing increasod steadily, mounting finally to 24 billions
of dollars, it was very ovidont that taxation would not be able
to furnish even a minor part of tho required amount and also
that tho government could not approach tho public for loans
every few weeks. Therefore the Troasury offered to tho banks
very froquontly more certificates of indebtedness, and a little
later tho savings certificates and thrift stamps. Tho Treasury
officials insiste.; on tho Reserve Board hooping the rediscount
rate low so that tho banks would carry the certificates.
(U
Soe Page 84
(2)
Villis, Po. .oral :escrvo Gystom, p. 1213
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The Board was opposed to the lor; rate becauso of the real
danger of inflation and oxccscivo credit at a time when they
felt that undue credit should he retarded, hut they had to
yield to the wish of the secretary of the Treasury.
(1)
A, C. Miller, in commontinj on the discount policy of the
deserve Board from 1914-1919, pointed out that no control of
the money market could come from this policy "because the
system had to assist the Treasury in floating it3 "bonds and
certificates* Such practico was later called "economically^
unsound" "by Governor Harding, hut it was inovitahle on account
of the tiraeB.
However, as the months went on and bank credit soared to
the accompaniment of soarin; prices and ominous conditions in
all banks, the Board attempted to bring some balance by urging
stricter credit control and conservation of resources at all
tho memoor banks. At the same time, the War Department,
sensing financial danger, urged tho practice of similar moa3uros
throughout tho country. But instdad of Improvement, conditions
grow worse, and as a final catastrophe, after tho resignation of
?• A. Delano from the „.o serve Board In the summer of 1918, the
Treasury department tool: over control of tho system, utterly
ignoring the reserve Board. It appeared then as if the whole
(2)
system would be utterly destroyed, and If the war had lasted
much longer, that probably would have boon the outcome.
(1)
Hiller, Federal Reserve olicy, American Economic
Boview, June, 1921, p. 105
(2)
;/illis, The 7e .oral Besorvo System, p. 1?>25
rr
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During this sarao poriod there was much dissatisfnotion
with the .:osorve system concerning the control of foreign ex-
change and regulations that had been made for tho flow of
specie. As 1918 advanced the situation "became more serious
"because of the inconvenience and displeasure which these regu-
lations wore causing in foreign countries. Fortunately the
armistice came just when this situation was critical and con-
ditions for tho control of foreign exchange v?ere immediately
eased*
Although the signing of the armistice marked the end of
the war, yet that date did not marl: the ond of the war period
for the :.eserve system, Tho government still had to continue
its war financing to supply funds to the almost bankrupt allies
and therefore thore could "bo no immediate change in tho policies
of the Reserve Board. However, there was evident on all sides
a decided change of feeling by this time and It looked as if
the beginning of a new period was at hand, The change of
attitude was in connection v.ith centralisation, and because
thore nad boon so much of it, there was now a desire on all
sides to shake off all traces of it. The public also was
awakening to its responsibility concerning industry and the
credit system that they mi;ht both bo made to servo tho good
of the country. Just then came tho retirement of tho
Secretary of tho Treasury, ..m, C, HcAdoo, in 1018, and in his
place was appointed Carter Class of Virginia, Glass had been
one of the frcmors of the PKDEKAI RESERVE Act and was very much
r.
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interested in the pkoserve system, so that It lookc 1 as if the
Board with the cooperation of the new Secretary might "bo ablo to
carry forward those policios which they "believed might aid "busi-
ness and improve banking. But when it came to the funding of
the Victory Loan in l!ay, 1919, Soc*y. Glass felt that there
would ho greater danger in changing the IlcAdoo policy than in
continuing it just at that time. Concerning the low rates of
(1) (2)
the Victory Loan, Holdsworth quotes from tho r.er.ort of the
reserve Board, ^Those rates instead of boing higher than the
market rates, as in theory and normal practice they should
have boon, were made lower than tho market rates. This cir-
cumstance is enough to provont the normal functioning of the
rj:D::?JLL HESEEVH banks, whose ratc3 should be so fixed that
rosort thereto is unprofitable to the borrowing institution,
and thU3 has a tendency to chock czqjansion".
Although tho Board was disappointed in their expectation
of an immo late improvomont in conditions, yet Soc'y. Glass
had confidence that tho system would be able to endure whatever
tho future hold in store for it.
Tho adjustments which tho P.osorvo Board felt were most
needed for tho financial safety of the country had to do with
tho thrco worst effects of tho war: tho inflated currency sit-
uation, tho enormous holding of government obligations by
banks and tho extension of long term renewal loans. The Board
fl)
Holdsworth, Tionoy and Banking, p. 491
(2)
Annual Report of Federal ".:o3orvo ;ooard,1^19, p. G7
t
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realized the super-task it had on its hands in the solving of
these problems and in putting into x^actioe sound frftltiflng
methods, while at tho same Lime the members wondered if they
:ould ho strong onoujh to enfoi-ce tho reflations necessary
for proper control and supervision, thereby to regain their
leadership and independence of the Treasury.
V/ith this situation we come to the beginning of the post
war poriod. Businoss was attemp-tinj to return from the
heights of war inflation to a more normal basis. This could
come about only with the removal of restrictions which had
boen placed on the investors of the country during the war.
Consequently these restrictions wore removed and industry
began to boom. The rosult was very soon apparent in the
largo offerings of security values on the marliot. These
wore, as inevitably they must bo, accompanied with a corre-
sponding demand for ban: credit, so that in 1911) when the
member banks should have boon paying off thoir indebtedness to
the i:oserve banks, they woro not doing so but were lending money
for speculative transactions, bringing about an abuse of credit
(1)
all ovor the country. Jov. Warding in discussing this condition
a year later said thoro had been too much rediscount ing, but
with ratos as they wcro below the market rates, the Board felt
the bo st policy was to provent "further expansion for non-es-
sential purposes, and work for a gradual and orderly liquida-
tion of non-essential loans'' and to bring ere .it bad: to normal-
ity by "speeding up" production and distribution. The Reserve
(1)
Harding, Tho peroral ...c serve on Trial, Tho Tor urn,
Ilov., 1920, p. 291
r
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author it ios coald not take the stop they wished to in order
to control this situation, i.e., increase the discount rate,
for the Government authorities wero still insistent that it
should he kept low. Conditions would have hoen vory differ-
(1)
ent t if the :oard could have talcon full control.
At this time the foreign trado situation was causing
much difficulty since the "burden of financing this trade on
a vory laigc scale had been thrown on the United Slates after
the signing of the Armistice. with the Unite., States chang-
ing "because of the war from a dohtor nation to a creditor
nation on account of the groat loans to the European conntrio
for war purposes, there should have hoen aft or tho Armistice
a decrease of credit to those countries, hut snch was not the
case. 3ariks kept on entonding large amounts of credit and
American manufacturers kept on selling to Europeans at high
prices on credit although they felt douhtful about payment.
All those circumstances had brought about a dangerous situa-
tion which, if it was to bo remedied needed vital treatment
immediately. The ;;osorve Board in previous years had done
nothing, but now, forcou into do in:; something on account of
the croat foreign indebtedness for goods, proposed the J^dge
Act. According to this there was to be a definite plan for
the financing of foreign trade and for relieving the banks
in the U. S. of this financing It provided that long term
foreign paper should bo kept out of tho Reserve banks and it
created a special group of institutions to finance foreign
(1)
Millor, ?e..oral ;.e3orvo olicy, American Economic
Review, June, 1921, p. 109
f
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trado, thoso being f.uito similar to the long estrblishod in-
vestment trusts of Europe, However this very ood plan camo
to naught, and "by the close of 1019 tho bankers of the country
became very much concorne.. with tho foreign indebtedness.
In view of tho threatening danger cause-. Irr the home
conditions of speculation and tho great foreign indebtedness,
the FEDERAL RESERVE Board, having seen a now high level set for
brokers* loans in the fall of 1910, finally abolished the pref-
erential rate for tho discounting of Liberty bonds and govorn-
(1)
ment paper. It was in Hecomber, 1919, that CW* Harding
icsuod tho "declaration of independence 7 ' of the Reserve Board,
3aying that he and tho members had decide \ it was now time to
act independently of the Treasury "with war so far bohind",and
that tho Hoard would function according to the dictates of bus-*
inoss in the futuro. Soe'y. Class agreed that there was no
economic justification for this preferential rato, and approved
tho incroaso of the rediscount rato throughout the country of
naturally the steel; market valuos decreased at onco, and
(2)
Ur. Dodge gavo Gov. Harding cro it for turning: a billion dollars
during that winter, 1919-1920, from "TJall Street into productive
business''. This was called by Dodge the first efficacious novo
made by any government agency to reduce tho cost of living since
1914," and ho addod, ''It workod."
(1)
Dodge, Tallin- Banking out of olitics, Independent,
Dec. 11, 1920, p. L56
(2)
Dodge, as above, p. 569
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At the beginning of 1920, Janes A. Houston "became
the new Secretary of tho treasury. He was a firm "believer
not only in the limitation of war credit, but also in the
retirement of all possible war credit. "arly in 1920 he
"began this policy of , retirement by his announcement of
ending the War Financo Corporation and of the banning of
"unsound finance." Ho approved of high rateB, for ho hnow
they would mean reduction of funds for speculative purposes,
and agreed to an adjustment of interest rates on borrowing
according to tho mar3:et rates. I'o prove that the 3oard
(1)
was no longer pursuing a "hesitant" courso, A. C. Killor
citod the many increases made during that year, with tho
rate finally reaching 7 .
After closing the war Finance Corporation, Seo'y*
Houston turno . his attention to the question of foreign
credit. Though many of the foroign countries were anxious
for a greater oxtonsion of erodit to thera, the Secretary
decided to stop this even thoa;h it would react on American
markets by decreased demands for American products.
About tho same time it bocano very evident that the
European government officials were unwilling to exchange
the short time notes which vhey were holding "or Unite
States bonds since they were hoping for cancellation.
This decision mado the treasury authorities enbarh on a
policy of conservation which was readily agreed to
Reserve officials who urged a decrease in holdings of
(1)
Miller, "-'oJ.oral eoorve oliey, American
economic Review, Juno, I921f p. 190
(
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foreign acceptances. It foroi jly jrDu.ht to the attention
of tho whole banking community this crave dan-jer and al30
the work of tho Reserve banks in tryinc "to eliminate such
unhealthy speculation, with tlie rosult that in tho spring of
1920 tho credit situation v*c showing much llljH ilfWUlli i
These polioioc of tho Loard were approved by bankers
(1)
and business men In conoral, according to Oov. JLardir:;, who
folt that the improvement in tho credit situation fNM due
in lar^e part to Ihe use of more liquid paper. There was
still a lar^e amount of 'war securities out, although a fair
reduction had been mado on account of the inceases in dis-
count and interest ratoB. A^ain the reserve system was
i^rovin^ its worth for it was the controlling factor In aterc-
fl)
ming the growth of oxecstlTO cro.it, and Gov. Harding was
certain that a c
;
uiet return to normal was coming.
By the la Iter part of 1920 the foreign trade situation
was much more satisfactory, Figures showed a decided re-
duction from the earlier inflated foreign trade balance and
the outlook co one d to bo for a further dec: case. Hlgh+T
prices on account of the discount rates and unf?v-orcble e::-
chan -e conditions uero important factors. Il the rooncy
strin^ency £jrew, the Lanka were not anxious to furnish funds
to send ^oods tioroad, or to enlarge their foreign exc'han;-;o
transact! oi. s.
(1) Hardin^, She ~odcral :;csorvo on '?rial,
rorum, L'ov. 1920, p. 297
<
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I'oward the end of 1-120 i- decide, downward trend in
businoDS sot in to£*ethor with a decrease in prices.
3ecause there is air/ays loss demand for cre.it when prices
are low, it brought a great decrease of bank credit, but it
worked out very slowly 1'or a decrease in credit ulwoys moves
more slowly than a decrease in prices. Many people felt
that the high rates allowed by the Reserve Uoard wore the
cause of high prices and of the loci: of prosperity, but they
failed at first to real ire that, although the system was or-
ganized to prevent panics and assist the
,
onoral community,
nevertheless it could not influence the causo of the present
trouble—the inflation and the deflation duo to the war time
period. La tor on it became evident to all that the P.esorve
fi)
system had boon a roal bulwark during i;hlc time, A. C. Miller
said, T, it is primarily to its steadying influence that the
drop in prices during the past eight months did not eventuate
in a completo disastrous collapse. The :\ :j :MAL HESEKVB
system has met its first searching tests with remarkable
success. rt
However when the presidential campaign of 1?£0 ^tarte:.,
both the Democrats and the e.^ublicano made the l-.eservo system
one of the election issues with T>romises of many a&angfi to be
made in it for the good of the Qotsfcry* ilev-r-hcless the
Heservo Joard continued its policy of contraction of or suit
(1)
Uiller, Federal ;.c30iv;- olicy, American Economic
P.oview, June, X9fil, p. IV?
©
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without any partisanship. I.lr. Liillcr testified to the
strength of the &0&rft in tho courage of itn convictions as
follorvs: "Tho fact that in tho hoat of a presidential cam-
paign. 49 it (the r.osorve Board) did not yield to ocotional
or political pressure of any character has done much to set
at rest tho doubt.. «a3 to r/huthor any system of reserve
banking onder governmental supervision conic, "bo full;' suc-
cessful in the Unite., ^tatcs bocauso of polities*"
3y the end of 1920 the Board's policy o" contraction
had brou ht about a large decrease in tho amount of crc lit*
(1)
rhis policy according to !i. I. Willis «M very stror.; in
averting a panic at that time. Where had been nany business
failures, many barJ: failures, and a It rgc rodnc ion in
foreign trade, but in spite of all thonG ur_fnvorr.blo circum-
stances, business and finance WtXte looking f&TV&rA to tho be-
ginning of a botter period*
Concern in:: tlio aid given by the FSDBRAX system
flj
in averting a panic, II. • Willis said the lessor: to We
learned uas that nnlimiter. cro lit co^ld not help business,
but that restriction, control ano stimulation are the things
needed in times of inflation and deflation, and also that
panics might a; L:car, since tho Reserve &jj'i-.;n \;. .s not being
usee as it ought to bi to control the ore it situation, B
lack due to its emergency dcvelo-jnent . ''ho conditions ex-
isting then, lir. V.il:is thought, r/ould have boon char god had
Pillis, Po .oral .:ooorvo pv alon, 1417
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the Reserve author! cios gone into opon marlre-c ox) orations and
into the foreign field so that they could use central banl:
control and not depend on slot/ rate changes. As lone as
the present conditions held, ho was cortc in that the Reserve
system could only help panics, not prevent them.
At this same time the Reserve system was the subject
of discussion on acr jt nt of the earning of tho Reserve
banks, the salaries paid in the system, and the building
program planned. 2ho earnings of the Reserve banks had in-
creased tremendously during the war era at tho low rates
which were maintained, coins from two million dollars in
1916 up to 5D million in 1010 and to 02 million hy 1920.
f
.?his lattor amount was of advanta.oo to the government for
it moant that the franchise tax it would receive v:as 60
million dollars because of the arrangement by which all
above tho dividonds, except 4C il'or surplus, should be <;Gid
as a franchise tax. ./hen the system was new, it was re-
proached because of tho low earnings; at thi3 point of Its
history it was "olrmed because of its lar;;e earnings, The
nattor of salaries lod to an investigation and comparison
of salarios paid in -.;he Reserve system with those of other
banhs. Senator Glass showed Con^ross that tho criticisms
(1)
were unjustified. An editorial in the Outlooh commended
Senator SlMf for p.ay in;; that "ignorant or uninformed
attacks on the system are not tho way to promote its effi-
ciency. ,f
(1)
Defense of the rederal ;;osorvo Bftfflrtng System,
Outlook, Peb. 8,1922, p. 210
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Ao to the building prograra which y/r-s considered al-
together too elaborate, there wos much Justification for it.
The Reserve banks had had to go into rented bnil1 dings since
the old subvtrcasurics were valueless and obsolete. Daring
the war because of the high j rofits, the taBtUdin program
VM started so that the ?ssorvo banks might be located in
quarters eoraparoole to other l»c,nv s, bat when the estimates
went ap to 10 million dolDsrs, the polltlolsni r.ttr oked the
plan. 3nt perhaps tine hrr prov ?d the wise.on of t'--.- ; oiicy
Instead of the righteousness of the attack.
PWFlllg £982 mnch process was node ir decreasing the
volume of war pp.per rrtiich had bee held by the barks, The
puLlie had taken over these obligations after the adjustment
of the interest rates or. ;/ovorrr.oirt paper with the nr^ et
rates. In this way tho heserve banks and member banke made
a very substantial reduction in their portfolios, reducing
their holdings of government prpnr to 640,000, 000. The
cash reserves oi the member banks increased greatly during
this -err for about -660,000,000 in cold cane into the
country. This gold wan taken by the unfile? banks and used
by them to decrease their debts to t he Reserve banks, thereby
improving the situation for tho hoserve banks. But another
important stop sight have been taken at this time which would
have liar a rroat bearing on decreasing i nilat '.on. This, as
fl)
suggested by K. J. Dodge,VPBid hfve boon t o removing of
(1)
Dodge, Changing the Fundamental structure of the
hoaervo System, Annals of the American Academy, 3e. t.IO.Jl, p. 80
<
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government bQ&&s Tor collateral io: conacrcial ^-_or offered
for rediscount at ?.hc fesorve ban*:s, thus emphasising the
neod of prime commercial pa^cr. jv;ever this was not done,
and thus the period of inflation was loncrthened.
At this sane ;ime honkers' acceptances and tr • do ac-
ceptances were in disfavor "because of the abuses o onnoct ed
with their aae. 'inkers 9 acceptances wore being asod aa
3low }.aper in order to extend credit With the result that
many banks were affected ana some had to be close.:, es-
pecially those cn^a^ed in financing foreign transactions.
Uy the end of the year the volume of acceptances had de-
creased by 600,000,000, and acceptances had lost their
proatiyc. Just about this time the Board decided to allow
maturity of six months on acceptances, but many banliers
felt that that was not f;ood policy. Trade acceptances too
had lost their good reputation after the war, as many wore
found |o 1)0 unsounu aau caused loss to the hftJ&Af 'Jno
r.eservo Hoard was consrrod because it had faxored the use of
acceptances. Jhe ^oard was also "olamcu at this time for
the condition of the farmers, From the be ylnnlny of the
Reserve oyston, the royulrtions had provided for fare: pftpei
a lower rate of discount and longer maturity than ordinary
paper, hut the country banks would not accept those terms,
and therefore the farmer .vas not yetting the Resistance v.hich
he should have had. ?hat however was not the fault of the
Reserve Bystora,—a fact which Was definitely proved when the
c
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Reserve system, in the first year of the Harding administra-
tion was brought on tho carpet by tho Agricultural Commission
of Inouiry which heard all that was to be said for and against
the Reserve systom, and finally ahsolved it of any blame for
the farmers* condition.
The above inquiry gives some idea of the situation con-
cerning tho Reserve Board during the Harding administration
in the period which ha3 boon called that of the ''introduction
of politics into the g.oserve system, Tf The Harding adminis-
tration did not approve of the membership of the pi-IDiillAl
HE3F.::VE Board for they considero-l it too democratic.
Governor Harding especially wps 1r. liefRYOT with the Senate
and "Thite H .nr.c tec anrJ wan »«o'! - rec^ olflfr toy Pres. larding
at Dm aspiration of his t nn Of office, goneral fooling
as it wrs—th"t of rveryono agpjnst tho "Board—it is no wonder
that thoy loot much of their BOmle aal throrgh llti -rau t of
their ovn, but bocanse of the lack ef <*oor oratior wl\en tho
administration (Vise ouraged tho.lv plans anil romodics for sound
banking practice. In spite of ail this, t« the surprise of
the general public, the system continued to go on r, scientifi-
(1)
cally and impartially "
•
Tho year 1922 without doubt markod tho lov/ost ebb of
the ;:oserve system because of the abuse horded on the Board,
and this not because of the condition of the Reserve banks
or of the Hoard's policies, but becauso of Be much opposition
(1)
Dodge, Changing ^sndameat&l Structure of tho
Federal ^osorve System,Anna? n of the American Academy,
Sept. 1921, p. 79
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from the adninistration and the system of patronage practiced
at this time, torjothor with the attempts of the banking com-
munity at largo and especially the country ban":.s to undermine
the system. That the opinion eoncorninp the part ilayod by
the Harding administration has not been soft one . "by tine was
apparent as lato as this pact year (1929) according to
(1)
II. P. illis who, ctated that presidont Hardin;: v/ith hie
ap] jointments, for example, that of his "crony" M govern)!* of
the :;eservo system, did his best to debauch the m stora.
raj
One important feature of the year 1922 was the bc-
giAlliftg if branch banking* '."his VSI inaugurated by the es-
tablishment cf branches by u :>mc of the lar^o state bank**
A great .civan\ >\, j • o Grain,: ire • ' .iJ DCwa'jlichmcnt was felt
in "cho p^ricultural sections especially, for the farmers were
benefited not only by a deero. se in interest rates, but also
by boinc provide! with safer bftAkln eycrfceiBJtt* One result
of the establ 'ohmeiitl of tV. j bra&eh lMNQjkS *y the state insti-
tutions wrrj . Icercaso in ^'r number of national banks. f§
prevent this decrease # the J era ...trailer of tho ^roasury al-
io.;ed the rrivilo pe of openin ; branches to national banks
within their respective cities in those states which permit
branch banking. Tho whole subject of branch banltin,;: for
eovoral years received some attention and discussion with
many recommendations and so pp.: est ions from the FEDERAL HBSEHYE
(1)
Villis, Failure of the Federal Reserve, ITorth
American .ovlew, Hay, 1929, p. 550
(2)
Annual Report of the "coral ..o servo ^oard,1922, p.
5
r
* Willi!—Federal Reserve System, p. 1498
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Hoard, but it uas not until 1927 that i real foruard step
uas tahen concorning branch banking when the Ilcraddon bill
uas passed. ?hat rd.ll bo taken later in this survey.
Tho history of tho post uar period of the ..c serve
system nay close at this tine. Superficial judgment con-
cerning the system's standing at tho close of this period
uould decree that there had boon no advance from its posi-
tion at the beginning of tho uar five years earlier and that
it uas still lacking in that economic control uhieh it should
have to stabilise bULinrss and flnaroe throughout the country.
Houever a fair ovalnatlon of Ifei syetorr WOttlA Wt* into con-
sideration the faot that tho plan and the nachinory for worl:-
ing out tho plan had not boon nado for such 8 cataclysm as
tho T/orld had esqxirienced :n- fo? ?.: tho Bnuaurl r:tr^in3 it
entailed. thai! i": had fon::tiono& ft&d functioned uell in
tho times of stress nhy rc :• the o:cfcra- ordinary efficiency of the
plan, tho machinery, and tl v " To give some idea of tho
efficiency displayed, Ifill ia* said that the /.oservc system uas
bettor managed during the v;ar than the United Stains' army.
That nay bo an exaggeration, but with botb successful, docs it
greatly matter?
Before going on to the next period thcro is one defect
of tho systom uh'ch noods to be mentioned. Th t uas tho lack
of strength in tfce systom to mal:e its dir.co- at rate effective.
(1)
Because of this there irai "scan I use" of rediscount during the
(1)
Koldsuorth, Lion g ..nC Bai&lnf, p. 407
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early days of the system, when B feeling of ''"humiliation*
was associate a with rediscocntlns. Shis lad: cam© from
the sllyht participation of the It—Tft system in open
mar>ot transactions and kept tho system an emergency one,
being neither a load?? in the money mar :.ct nor an import-
ant factor in the credit field, Shis lack of the system
—
that of roynlc.r doalinys in the money r^rl"oti~--i'\'de it en-
tirely different from the jrr-y oan ccnvral b;\nke which are
~nch | oworful factors in the fields of monoy and credit.
"ott thin greet defect was adjusted Trill appear in the later
history.
7/ith tho besinning cf we enter on the period of
normality which will incline the years from 19S9 to the fall
of lt27. As tho darkest time is always just before dawn
so it is 7/5 th the FT^DrJIAX . : system, for with the coming
of the MB year, began a very much changed cr.istenco for the
syEtem, 'th unlocked for vlyor the Beard started on a new
fl)
course w ' t. vr s destined to wotk yroat yood. VLoir new plan
was to fomnlcte their future olicios according to tho needs
of the country as jn&ge by the amount of production, the
volume of trade and tho total ef ban': credit. This informa-
tion is yathored by the yosorvc .3oard v/oek by 7700k and pre-
sented to the public in the 9BUHRAX l^^IJVE bulletin which is
sent out each month.
(1)
Annuo 1 Re ort of ye .oral .'.cr .'i'o Board, 1933, p. 55
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(1)
H« !• Rood in evalu ?ting the wor;: of this period
characterised tho policy achievements of the Board as note-
worthy in that they narked the first roaction from tho
fright brought on "by the crisis of 1920. The banks had
pnt aside the eiser^ency development they had had to practice
and wore ~oiny on a new and hotter way— that of "keeping in
touch with tho market" and civinc real evidence of "bettor
fl)
thinking concerning the tests of sound credit.
«
With the realisation that thero should be a return to
the idea of central banking came proper attention on reserve
ratios, on the inflow and outflow of .old and o:ft that so
closely linked with tho sold movement—fore l£n exehaoget
U)
Other Important policies of 19\j wer: concerned with
the o^e.<i BSrket operation? of the "_-.o serve banks, rediscount
operations and rate ozohar -os, The open market operations,
as wo have v>ointou out befortj have to la Wtffc th t hnyinc and
selling by "'he ;.^r:orve bPnkr? in the 9* w market of whatever
investments are allowed accord inj to the FTSEKAL HIS. :?.T. :: Act.
In doinp this uhe Reserve banks doal directly with the public.
Bocanse the open marlcot operations had "ropped to I very low
] oint dnriny the >;ost war period, a coj.l itteo was ap ointed in
1023 to do what it could to coordinate tho open market opera-
tions of the -twelve ;.e3orvo banks, and thereby make this method
a real moans of influencing the scnoral credit policy.
(1)
Peed, kecent federal Reserve policy, Journal of
political Economy, Jane, 1929, p. 414
•
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Such a stop would also have e groat bearing on red isc 5 ant-
ing by membor banks, fh« arc -in* of rediscounts had boon
increasing during the period of tho docreaso of open market
fin
operations. £ha*i is a vast difference in the initiation
of the two procedure s of open market operations and red is-
counting; in the former tho koserve banks take the initial
step t while in the latter tno member banks take trie initiative.
How the two procedures interlock may be real iced ftf— the fact
that the domand for ^eserve bank credit i3 measured by the
amount which member banks have to borrow from the ?e serve
banks to re-uluce fundn rttWir'n n by th- .luatzvi |pf jrtrfll through,
the ealos of securities, and 9 ..a in canst, of tho interlocking,
the open market policy everts a greet influence or. Liu.- a.-.iount
of rodi3COunting by the no^Lor banflkCM The priaojl 1c 0.: the
open market policy as rtatei by tho Board at '';h.is time u.is
that those operations ohouir. bo carrier, on with tho idea 01
accommodating business and commerce so that the general re-
action on the whole credit structure would be favorable,
Tho Board was able to carry out its plan and in its Report (2)
for 1925 mentioned the lar^e development Tf in the scope, pur-
pose and method of open market operations' 7 with satisfying
results which showed that, if that policy wero wisely oarried
on, it would have a much greater effect on the discount policy
without any change of rates than had seemed possible. That
fl)
Annual Report of the Federal reserve Board, 1925,
P..13
(2)
Annual Report of Federal ..oscrvo Board, 1025, p. 11
Annual Report Federal Reserve Board, p. 9
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it has since "boon carried on successfully is vouched "or "by
(1)
H. S. P.vikQyaer who s^eal:3 of the unity of tho work of the
open market comnitteo. The Board also stated in comment inc
on the oeonomic stability of 1925 that the Reserve system
then soomed to be following the policy of the KB8EHTE
Act, "accomr.iorating business and eom/.:crue, and to be aocon-
plishinc its objective, that of a ''steadying influence on
credit conditions."
Hie rate policy of 10. was very satisfactory for it
marked the year of fewest rate changes in the history of the
system. xhe only change of Jtajportaasa was. an JjfttrtSftt of |jf
effective in thT6# of the flcaezve- bOJ&flg inr-o-. L*nj fcfeSSt
rates from 4£t to 4^.'» 'This change .... /.;;cC thf first advance
in noarly two years, and brought, Wltfl it a uniform r? tc at
all the : loserve ban*:b # jhat sl-.-p was ar, s.^.ccirlj.y £?ood one
In thai; it tended to sake borrowing noi'c uniform, for the
practice pru7ioui.: this had pees foa osvoj 1 3 borrow from the
banks that had the lav est rates.
Iltfc this now start the Reserve systsn Trent forward gain-
Ins momentum ail the vine anu even tiding over t'.io months of
(2)
1023 Withoot any strain when tho business rSSOSSlSJ) did come.
So generally successful was the system in 1925, nnd so free from
perplexing problems, that the ..esorve officials felt it was an
ideal year.
(1)
Rnkeysor, Wall Street and the rodcral . oserve,
The nation, Jan Be, 1923, p« ioo.
(2)
::eod, P.ecent "cdorai ..osoive Policy, Journal
Political Economy, June, 10^0, p. 415
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The public readily agreed that the stabilization of prices
had resulted from the steadying feeling of the Preserve
authorities. Doubtless ttkt policy of the Board in fur-
nishing to the public tho economic information, referred to
in their report, to she-.: Whether credit was worliing for the
general good of industry and oomr.erco went far toward bringing
about this satisfactory condition. The Lord's attitude, as
expressed by their hope thai the public night understand the
reasons for their policies in attempt in ~: to raa::o credit condi-
tions more satisfactory and the viea that the public would co-
operate with them, had a cod effect on the publifl rt lar;-e #
(1)
*
The agricultural situation in 1923 was also bettered by
fi]
means of tho JLgriOttltur&l 8r*dlta Act, '.!?his provided for
two new classes of ciedit organisations for the farmers by the
establishment of the Federal Internationa?, Ore it Banks, which
were independent of the twelve farm land banks a and the national
Agricultural Credit Corporations, which may be established by
five or more persons with a paid in minimum capital of 0250,000.
An oscellont editorial in tho ;[erald of October 2, 1923
givoB U3 a fine summary of tho work of the PEDKRH RES IfifE
ay8 torn, as well as a warning to those who worJd tamper with it,
;:omo of the mout important features follow:
(1)
Holdsworth, Honey and T3an!:ing# p. 464
(2)
Willis and Steincr, Federal .'.e servo Banking Practice,] ..r:4G
IB)
Boston Herald, jet. 2, 1923
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''To tho intelligent atudaat af American banking and
currency history, the FEDERAL RSSEI^VE system must seam, in
its advent, its character and tho manner of its perform-
ances of function, little short of miraculous. i7e went at
ono stop from a system, which by c omparison with other
By toms of the >7orld was almost "barbarous, to a system which
is tho best (theoretically - .nil practically regarded )that the
civilized world has today to show".
"It is tho function of the government to coin money.
It is the function of bttJlktng to |8fltt money. Banking is
not and can never be a function of government so long as
business is a private function, for banking is a vital art
of bu8inoss. A bank chock nC a currency note perform ex-
actly tho sane ]-ind of wax*]:. Loth arc called ir.io bolng by
tho same business need— vith which need {^ovornnent lias nothing
and should have nothing to do. Do n a_\- United alt ta tely
by gold rosorves, for both must, if roquirod, be -aid in gold.
The whole process of banking is, in effect, merely the book-
keeping of business, subject always to this necessity. The
volume of a nation's check and banknote circulation is deter-
mined by the volumo of bu^inoos on tho one hand and on tho
other hand by the amount of gold roservo3.''
\9
i30
The FRDELvAL RBSEBYB system perfectly exemplifies
these principles. ItQ primary function is I currency
function, namely, that of supplying to business the cur-
rency note circulation that "business requires. It tl as
nearly perfect* system of currency as ono can csrpoct to find
in this world. It is absurdly simple and at tho same time
of e3-qui3ito delicacy, and it couches each Wit ovory one of
us at all points of onr business lives. In this very per-
fection lies tho danger, "
" "Sow, tipple as is the macbin ry of th; reserve
system it is not susceptiolo of tinkering without groat
dangor to the machinery as a whole. If v;o v/ant a thorough-
ly good curi-ency and bm>ing system—\rhioh \?g lu.vo—r.c mist
he satisfied to take the necessary meejis, delegate the nec-
essary powers and accept the necessary Joatrols, V,o middle
course is open to us, ?horv is ni sz m f:.r asrpor iriont. .e
have every reason to bo proud of the IfflEKAI BESEBYB sy ton,
but we havo oven more need to he careful of it,"
The policies of the FEDERAL RESSRVE Board for the year
(1)
1924 have hoen characterized hy 3U» I.e. d r_s daring* The
Board was attempting to ease the general credit situation "by
means of open mar!:ct corporations and thus kopt tho amount
of ::esorve bank credit larjo. They decided that a rate re-
duction was necessary in order to increase member banks'
(1)
P.eod, Recent federal Ilesorvo . olicy, Journal of
political Economy, Juno-Aug. 1329, p. 400
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discounting and thereby increase their own holdings of
United States securities. the result wa3 an increase of
)3, 000, 000, 000 of MtbU bnnV credit in loans and invest-
ments.
Reserve "ban!: credit durin this period decreased
greatly and reached I very lew point as compared with 1922
and 192£. Thin mm account §1 for \gf the inflow of fcolA
which for the past four yoar3 had been steadily increasing.
(See chart p. 62). But when a ehan /o came and tho gold bogai
to go out of tho country, t'u- ?,on;rt., instead of trying to
firm money, kept on with their attempt to once tho ere it
market. KtOli fault was fonrii with t ic authorities because
(1)
of this policy. covurnor Strong hlas9£f said later on that
it might have boon bother If the authorities ha.; afo^ped buy-
ing ceo ; ritios sixty days earlier.
A had feature in connection with the great increase of
momber bank credit at this time was that a very la:c e part of
it was being uaed in connoe'eion with security operations. It
was a time when many new security values were being offered,
and tho reports, while much loss comprehensive than at the
present (1029 ), showed that the stool: market had absorbed a
very largo amount of this credit by the end of 1924.
(2)
That conditions for the Reserve system in 1924 were
not on a par with those of tho previous year must bo laid
(1)
Reed, recent Federal Reserve lolicy, Journal of
Political Economy, June -Aug. ,1029
, p. 400
(2)
Annual .eport of Federal ..cserve Joard,l c;24,p. 1
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to the businoss recession which was felt .for most of the year.
As this affected industry ani employ Want, it also was the
cause of the rate decreases which at some ban:s made the new
rato as low a3 3 • Tao ran^e at all the ..c serve bonks was
from 5
;
to 4, • 2he Reserve joard in 1J24, treating; of the
discount and open market policies of the ..o serve banks, com-
mended thorn for the course pursued "with regard to the "broader
aspects of th:> crodit situation and the basis provided "by the
FEBKBAI KE3ERVB Act for discount policy and adopted by the
3oard as the princix^le for the conduct of open market opera-
tions, n 71io.l c had been much criticism "by the bankers because
(2)
of these open marhat o_ ;ati one, bat friends of the system
showed that this was the onl^ way for oho Reserve Board to act
if thtj wcro '' Dir. , t-j bo able to ^ay their way.
(3)
Zhi year 1C2& was called by the i\:p::AL R2SBEVB Board
the bo st ye- r ' hat the BuooxTi banks had yet experienced.
Events in khls country and abroad tended to brine about this
condition, and prove tl - strength and usefulness of tho
::c serve system, Fhf banks wore celled on to aid in financ-
ing a hu^c volume of production and tra^o in this country—
a
groat contract |o the i^rovious year— arid abroad their aLoist-
ancc was sought for the rest oration of the ^old standard. The
latter hapwenin;; was the out st it. din.;; achievement of FEDERAL
RXJRBYB policy for the year.
fl)
Annual keport Federal ::o serve Joard, 1984. p. 12
[*]
Hanson,Fe oral ..o servo under Fire Agftln, The
Independent, Doc. 13.1924. p. 627
(S)
Annual koport Federal he servo ;oard, 1925, p. 1
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In order to "brin;; about the restoration of the cold
standard in the great trading countries of the world, an
arr&n foment was nado between the TB WUlL HESE :VK ban' -a
and tho 3ank of ".ne'land for the reestablishment of the
free sold market in London. :.o3trictions on the export
of fold wore removed and at once the Bank of Kflglftnft
bought ^-200,000,000 in cold from tho PKBDUUi SSMftS banhs
with delivery to tal:.e lace durln; tho succeeding two
years* For this tho ?>ari. of .n;-lami would credit the
neoervo banks on their boo!:s and it could bo used for the
• purchase of bonk i;a\cr eligible in ' ".n, land. This ar-
rangement made possible the resumption of cold payments
and meant that ;;old was afain the standard of value and
that trade could now be conducted on a solid foundation.
It also assisted the .old movement to regain normaloy.
With the beginning of the '/orld :.rar the movement bo can to
be abnormal and this had continue, for ton years.
r
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Another result of the ahove mentioned an augment
uas the lar^e investment of foroi£n tttftltl throiv .-"a the
ITcu York Reserve oarC: in jankers • acceptances with the
result that the volume of acceptances held by the
Reserve btttfes vres the lar^os-c in it 3 history. -
(See chart—earning Assets of frKESRAI RSSEHYF BaaSHM )
(1)
Annual Report of the Federal deserve Board,
1024, p. Z
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For tho first tine since tho beginning of the Reserve
cyston tho hoserve banhn wax* nov; carrying out in a normal
way the provision of tho Act Whloh allowed dealings with
fore«.5n oari^, for u^ to this time all thoir tranaaot ions
had "ooen so injod with the ,'ar as to he far from normal.
deserve banh crodVic increacod durbv.. the yoar,
reaching the hijhost amount since 1921. (Stl above chart)
?ho reasons for the increase were tho large export of gold,
t'ic ?uv: ys currency re u Irene nts, and tho greater demands by
member banhs. That tho ..eservo barhs could fulfill the
necessary donnndj on then was an cxcellont test for the
system, for the strain was groat in sat Lsiyinj tho hone calls
and tho huropean requirements too. ;';uch a result was possi-
ble on account of tho elastic currency plan and the gold re-
serves hold lv . he sj. t v.- •
Business '..tie good in this year and bttlnsss nan were
attempting more th.cn over to adjust production, to demand
with tho a«0l stance of FUjI-^AIi HESEHtJS statistics, x'he
pnhlic attitude toward the system was now appreciative
Since business won had roali'jed that it was the -nrop on
(1)
which they as borrowers wore dependent. : • '. iorson
saiC ' I this time that although there had been many sug-
gestions for the inx rovenont of the system, yet those had
to do with detail and not with the fundamental principles-
a conu.it lor, most . ncorrajin;; to him.
fl)
Pierson, u'oighing who ^oderal ..o serve in the
Balanco, Bankers hajazine, July, 1025, p. 70
J
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flklfl yonr (1925 Jwitnessed a rapid reaowjh of loans "by
(1)
aoiaber banhs, with a lar^e amount of those loans £Oin-
(Z\
into the security market. The public was warned at this
time that thoy should not orqioet help through thoir Ir .r' s
from the P.e serve bankf for speculative purposes, and <=> do-
ereaco in the amount of speculation did. follow as soon "c
the disc cunt rates were increase 1 "by the l.o servo Ba. rd.
m
Business coalitions in 1923 were unusually ::ood, and
Reserve banhs credit increased only slightly. Ban> loans
on securities declined durin.*; this period, while loans for
comrorcinl pur - oscs shone", a narhed increase The discount
rate at all t r o l.anhs for the 70a? was 4 The credit
policy of tho Reserve Board was to feeop the rate steady and
to continuo Its tptol marhet operations on I levol very near
that of tho previous year, Concernin." Reserve policy toward
the member banhs, tho loard in its report made a definite
pronouncement on what it called tho "individual banh credit
policy of the .esorvo b-nks".
fU
Itoed, jRooont Reserve Policy, Journal political
•'.eo.aorx/, -June -A up. , 1929
, p # 42S
(2)
IToyos, fhc federal ::o servo and 2 cculative Harlots,
Scrlbncr's, Apr. 1029, p. 493
(3)
Annual Re ort of federal Ret*Tve 2oard, 1926
, p« 1
If)
Annual r.oport of rcOjral Reserve Board, 1920, p. 1
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Anc ore. In;; to tho FEISBAI RESERVE Act tho Reserve banks
uoula ostend to member banks "such accommodations an may
be safely and reasonably Bftfii ::il~a duu regard for the
claims and demands of other member lm«Vg<* l?his was a
definite warn in': to those banks which woro continually
indebted to the deserve ban!-:3 for a comparatively lon&
period of time. BftHtttt a mc.nber bank ml^iib bo doing this.;
and so increasing its own funds by us in.;: those of tho
liesorvo banks, fthii procedure would be against tho intent
of the law and nito unfB..Lr to other member banks. Tho
Rftptrt addod that it wan always tho business of momber
hinVl to so adjust thoir own affairs that they mi;;ht repay
their borrowing at tho Reserve banks and so add to thoir
own r.tronjth. Decauso most of the mombGr banks had coop-
erated with tho Hesorve banks in this respect there was
Groat improvement, and tho Board pointed out that by ©n-
forcin;; this, they woro discharging thoir duty toward all
tho momber banks and ttftlng their influence for sounder
banking practice for all concorno...
Member bank credit increased rather slowly in this
yoar , and I good feature of this was vhe increase in loans
for cor.-ercinl pnrpOftftfl, not for security purposes.
However, a somewhat undesirable fe-aturo ftp] eared in tho
amount cf loans on real estate which Bftdfl up 12k of the
total loans. Bi cause of theso fcrlA&lAg in tho elomont of
Ion;; term credit which in contrary to "kio purposes of the
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WB SffiUI HESERYB Act, they do not work to the advantage of
the system. I'll is development together With that of loene
for securities was responsiole for the decided charge in
the amount of paper hold by member banks which was eligible
for rediscount at the ."..esorvo backs, ..liilc the >o< rd --id
not foci that Iherc was a scriors chortaje of this piper,
yot they were concerned "because It affected the operation-,
of member ban!:o f>;id "./a ,3 a harmful tendency to decrease the
volume of "good, chert term sclf-liqui.d;-L lag paper."
Tho year l rJ.37 went down in the blot077 of the .oserve
system as tho bannor yoar t for on Feb. 36t 198T wai paafled
the Act which assured continued opiate nee of the system,
V.hcn the ;;osorvo Act went into effect in lvitf, It gF ntod
to the .:oservo banks charters for twenty years, but the
(3)
:.'c7addcn Popper /.ct of 1027 made the ye charters ''.Inde-
terminate'' and affirmed 'the confidence of Congress in th«
FEDERAL EESEOTE system", assuring the system nana the
country a continuance of the sys . .-m 1 s operations on a per-
manent basis." .'his vote of perpotuity and confieenoo to-
gether with the fact that the world Wfri now economically :;>id
financially normal meant that the authori-jies for -she firsu
time could x l:.n long time policies which Iiad every pro..poot
of being carried out.
(1)
Annual £0 Drt of the Fo ..oral .'.e serve Board ,1926,p. 10
(2}
Annual Iic.oort of the Federal Reserve Soard, 1927,p.
1
19)
Annual Report of the Federal Reserve -;3oard, H37,p.42
i
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Easiness activity in the 01 rly part of this year was
/~ood and agricultural conditions both for crops &&t prices
wore- far ahead of the previous year. The business recession
which bet in in She Tall of the year aceountct for the amount
of kesorvo i>ank credit: ho la;; ft)) at the eame en in. 1926; bat
membor bank credit uas continuing to incrc .ee. A large part
of this was &dc to tho grov/th of security leans, for the
report of brokers ' loans made by the member ban^s showed tho
Groat demand of the security market a for credit. ! forever
the banks v/ere fimf tfllij only a part of these funds, for
there v/as reach idle money available and much of this v/as
being furnished by corporations here as v/cll as by foreign
il and foreign hanks* It was surprising to the
Board that rates wore so little affected when the supply of
money r/as so lar; c.
During this year the international gold movomont exerted
a very proat influonco on the credit situation in the United
States, Gold had been coming into ,;ho TTaited States in 1&»
creasin- I Mounts from 1020 up to Hay of 1£27 when it reached
the hi -host point in the history of the Reserve system*
(See Chart, £*9S] This n .art b reduction of indebtedness
by member banlis in early 1927 and also a decrease in ao^orve
IMS credit as aell as en easy condition in the money market.
In the sumnD r the 3arifc of France purchase., a large amount of
gold from the mi ted states and a reversal of the gold move-
ment began. At this time tho Reserve hanks eased tho money
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situation "by purchasing United States securities and also
reducing discount rates*
By the fall 6f 1C27 "business \ras receding 'here and
Etiffftpe ";as feeling a general credit .stringency, nhe ftSSV^i
aalhoriti.s, thinking that easy money conditions would assist
"business and finance "both here * mi abroad, again r > ' " to
open market operations and decreased rates. With rates so
much lo"er here then abroad, there he;: i ;,reat flew of
funds from the TTniteA States with, foreign eych;?n;7fl values ad-
vancing rapidly In "he lew rerlt warlcet# it the some tine
Argentina and Brazil, after having floated large loans in tho
United State*, were able to add ';o their* gele holding and so
withdrew tho jold fron Hew York rather than other places on
account of the low rates naintainlttg there* Phifl extra de-
mand, in addition to that of tho KuroT)ean countries and
Canada, decroe-ood tho gold stoch of the United States by
0^00,000,000 in the last four months of 1927. By that tin?
the FEDERAI HKSEKyS attthorit5.es were no longer offsetting the
offoets of the gold withdrawal by purchases of govermaent
securities, for they felt that with the decreasing demand
from trade and industry, rtcmher hr-.nl: credit was incy-or-sln^;
too rapidly through investments and loans on securities.
Tho above action of the Board has been styled the "cheap
(1)
none;- esagpal8nTrfor !:ho 'ben-" fit of the European banlrs,and
the Board hac been severely criticised for its policy during
tho lost months of 1987a
(1)
Or is17 old, ^finite :;c servo • ollcy, :a/>. of Business
June, 1920 f p . G50
~ 1
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(1)
31enn Criswold felt that tills period of inflation was the
deliberate result of FKDEEAL RBSSHIE policy hocauso of the
Board 1 o persistence in cheapening money when uhcy had lieen
warnod of the dan r or of inflat ion*
On the other hand, • ':. .lead defended the action of
tnc Board which ho 3aid must pot autocratic In raining
or lowering rates, as such action tended toward central-
ization of banking £>ower and would not bo approved. A nost
tolling point made by L'.r. Head, and ono which apparently
cannot he eontradictod, is that the f: . EBSEHYE must
"pomit the need of restrictive action to become thoroughly
apparent "before its power is exerciser' 2hat this noed
was then evident was justification onouh.
Concerning their acctr-tance in rent or in ; the cold
(S)
standard of 1227 the Reserve Board in their Annual :;eport
said: "In adopting a policy of intornational cooperation in
support of tho £old standard, the fS lURAI RESH11VE system
has actod in roc omi ;, ion of the responsibility resting upon
the country as holder of nearly one-half of the worlds
stoclr of nonotp-ry f^old, and of tho importance of sound
monetary conditions throughout the world to the prosperity
of industry and trade in the United States.' 1
\ J-
}
Griswold, Definite reserve ollcy, Mag, of
,uslnuss, Juno, 1929, p« 660
f*J
Jload, Action that was Justified, ..cvicw of
heviews, Sept. 1989, p. ;3s5
(3)
Annual report of the "e-.eral Reserve Dorird,
1927, p. 16
1
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Other features of banking during, 1927, "both direct-
ly and indirectly connected With t*0 Reserve system, were
(1)
nZ: norL:ors, chala banhinr; and branch Landing, In that
year a noticeable increase in the number of consolidations
and absorptions of member bahhs too' place. ahis in-
crease in mergers was due partly to the 'ic^adlen Act, which
amended the Federal feajUci&g laws, MR allowing direct con-
solidations of State banhs and trust companies with national
banks legated in the same county, city, town or vtllapo.
Chain banltlag! a comparatively new idea put through by
financial companies in the last few yoars, bos to do with
operations in the banlrinp fi^ld by those who acquire control
of independent banhs through ["!.' 3tock ownership and then
bring about mergers through this control. Since these com-
panies arc not dircctlp an a od in banking, accord i^ a; to the
Federal and State laws, they do not come under the super-
vision or examination of the hanking anther it Ics. Bart be-
cause it is so closely idonti.Mo with bnnhing activities,
~osorvo banking off ic ialc ore watching developments carefully*
Since the fWSBAl RBSEHVE system was founded on the
principle of branch banking it Is interesting to soo how
branch banking fared in the legislation of 1927. By t>he
HcFaddon Act of Feb. 25, definito regulations which had long
(2)
been needed wero made. These regulations defined, and limited
fl)
Annual Report of Federal .:o serve Board.1927, p. 43
(!)
Annual P.eport of Federal Reserve Board, 1027, p. 43
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the to inch. VmbMhc powers of momb.-.r ban':s, end prescribed the
terms "by which State "brunches would be admitted to the
Reserve eyoten. The l.osorve Board, be car; so of the now Act,
(1)
anonded the provions regulations which they had made to
apply to the branch tetfclflgc Shfl developments Ir. 1027 in
this line were chiefly the result:; of morgorfl ar>on~ the
banhs. There wac nc increase in the number o-f baa"; j 0;?crat-
ing brane.os, but an incrcf oc in the number of branches being
orated. ?his latter condition Hfti confine to certain
states, CrIi:'omia ; lene accounting for aboot ono-half of the
jrowth.
IVita the late fall cf 1927 comes an and of the policies
of the PwOservo Board for that per iod ^fliich we have ce lled the
xjeriocl of nor.:.alitp. In this we have witnessed r, regular
and steady development
.
in the FEDERAL IffiSFlHTS Eastern bo&lng
well for the future.
Since the last part of this paper will deal with a
consideration of the meet recent policies of the .occrve
j;;«'on, and the criticisms of these policies, it seems f|%*
t inj to review. here the porpoeee foj whi ch the ?.o serve system
was created. Then with those in m' nd wo shall have r basis
on which to judge Whether recont events have been wording for
or a -ainst :Jha30 nor 'OSes. Accord Jag to Ex-president
(a)
"ilao.i's plan, the FKDERAX HESB3YR systom, as H. VMLllin tells
fl)
Annual Report of the federal : .©serve .ioard,lv37, p.42
(2)
Willis, pailuro of the re.. oral Reserve System,
ITorth American r.eviow, Kayf1929f p. 540
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us, was to function in four distinct; wayo;
1. To smooth rates of int r est thrvuJ.out the Nation.
2, ?o make credit available on equal terms to all
entitle a to it for satisfactory securities.
Zm To a. ply "ban!: reserves sold*' to the purpose'
for which they were intcnclei;—the inaintainaa.ee
of solvency nnd jeneral liquidity in the many
banlro.
4 # u?o provide an organisation which would keep in
v'.r-.t the funda^eat: - !! in' '.roots of the public QS
the ^uido for all financial effort, at the sane
tine >:-e, in;: te the tested principle of careful
banking and sound credit.
•Vith those important purposes in mind, v;e shall see
3ome pictures of the more important phases of the :;o serve
system, shall present the policies of the fKHERAX HBS2HVH
3oard and concludo with present eay criticisms of the
system.
The important ph-oes. of the . eserve system which
show its working are*.
1. 2ho Reserve Bank holdings of
Vr\': 1 -'tatee securities.
2. Resexv* "Hani: credit.
3. Discouru rato»,
4. Jfembor bank credit cad borrow*
5. RLe gold movement.

73
' e take up first the situation from the fall of 19:27
through the year 1928*
mam m> Koiaiagst
In the fall of 1937 Reserve Bank holdings of the
United States Securities were at the highest point sinoe 1924,
a very great increase In these holdings In the six months from
May to November for May had marked the lowest point in hold-
ings for three years. A% this time, the end of 1927 , business
was receding here and the money situation abroad was stringent
Therefore the FEDERAL RESERVE Board eased the money situation
by selling some of their holdings with the result that a re-
versal of the gold movement began* Gold had been coming into
the United States steadily from 1920 with one slight exception
Much of this gold had been taken by the member banks to in-
crease their reserve balances. This Is Important for it is
said to be the foundation on which was built the rapid expan-
sion of credit which has been going on ever since, and will
be considered later. This outflow which began at the end of
1927 was encouraged by the Reserve Board which felt that the
money and trade situation throughout the world would be bet-
tered by this distribution of gold. The Board kept on dis-
posing of their government securities during the first six
months of 1928 and by that time the gold stock of the United
States had decreased by 240 millions. The sales of securi-
ties by the Reserve Bank caused a rapid Increase in the
borrowing of member banks from January through June for the
(1) Annual report of the Federal Reserve Board,1927,p.71
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sales of securities during that time amounted to over 350
millions of dollars. For the rest of 1928 the holdings re-
mained steady but at a comparatively low point*
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RESERVE BANK CREDIT:
To?;ard the end of 1927 the increase in Reserve Bank
credit waiquite marked when compared with the five proceed-
ing years. This continued to increase during the second
quarter of 1928 for three reasons s l. the export of gold on
a large scale, 2. the growing demand for bank credit on
account of better business conditions. 2* thesales of
securities already referred to and member banks increasing
(1) Federal Reserve Bulletin, Dec, 1929, p. 779.
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(1)
their borrowing. By the middle of 1928 the indebtedness of
ember banks was the largest in six years* A decrease set in
lasting for three months, but after that on account of the
autumn demand for commercial credit and currency and in-
creased growth in the stock market. Reserve Bank credit
steadily increased and by the end of the year was the highest
it had ever been. Therefore, the year 1928 stood as the peak
year for Reserve Bank Credit.
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Discount Rates
j
The discount rate in January. 1928 was Z \/2$> 9 During
the year several advances were made, the rate being 4,l/2$
by July for all Reserve Banks and finally 5% for eight of
them by the end of the year. The reasons given for these
increases were the gold export, the selling of the United
(1) Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 1928. p.p. 4 f
(2) Federal Reserve Bulletin, Dec. 1929, p. 779.
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States securities by the Reserve Banks, and the great In-
debtedness of the member banks. By the end of the year the
general level of money rates was the highest In seven years.
However, the high money rates did not react unfavorably on
trade and Industry for 1928 showed the highest level of In-
dustrial production and business activities In the history
of the country.
ITemper Bank Credit and Borrowings;
In 1928 member bank credit Increased rapidly, showing
business activity and a growing demand for credit for financ-
ing security transactions and for commercial purposes. How-
ever, the member banks did not decrease their borrowings for
by the middle of 1928 their indebtedness was over a billion
dollars, the largest In seven years. This growth In bor-
rowing went hand in hand with the great activity In the
security market and tht* advances in values of securities*
This brought the amount of loans to brokers and dealers in
securities up to the highest point It had ever been, being
by December 1928 6,1/2 billions. It Is interesting to note
at this time that the Increase of loans for others grei?
rapidly, showing that much of the money was from non-banking
lenders 1. e. from corpora .ions, individuals, firms and for-
eign banks. In New York City over half of the brokers 1 loans
belonged to that class. This left funds of the banks Idle and
so they turned to the security marks t and invested for their
own accounts as permitted by law. But they did not stop
there, but carried traders along In the stock market, so
accounting for the huge loans.
r
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And now we oome to the polioies of the FEDERAL RESERVE
Board for 1928 explaining the preceding situations. By the
end of 1928, when the gold reserve of the country had de-
creased by lofj and member bank credit had continued to expand,
the Board felt it must explain its responsibility for the
change in credit conditions and so issuod the following
(2)
statement:
i
"Since the chief duty of the FEDERAL RESERVE system is
te use its lending power for the best interests of the busi-
ness of the country and since the system holds the reserves
(1)
Federal Reserve Bulletin, Dec. 1929, p. 761.
(2)Annu*l Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 1928
p. p. 7,8
r
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of the members and through its credit policy influences the
growth of these reserves, the system is responsible for the
character of the growth of this member bank credit. Too
great growth or too rapid growth In any field of credit
—
commercial, industrial, agricultural, trading in securities-
Is a ooncern of the FEDERAL RESERVE system. Too rapid ex-
pansion of bank credit may result in financial disorganiza-*
tion and leads to greater demands for reserve bank funds.
Because the system has a great responsibility for general
credit soundness and because growth of bank oredlt for any
purpose leads to a demand for Reserve Bank credit, it feels
it is its duty to use its Influence against undue expansion
In any direction. In reoent years the most rapid expansion
of bank credit has been in the use of bank funds for in-
vestments and loans on securities. Between 1925 and 1928
the member bank holdings of Investments Inoreased by two
billions and loans on secur itles a little more than that.
A4 the end of 1928 more than 57$ of the loans and invest-
ments of member banks were in investments or loans on
securities. Therefore securities underlie more than half
of the outstanding volume of member bank credit. B
In order to correct this the Board felt that it was
better for them to influence the member banks by their
credit policy rather than banking policy. The credit policy
of the Board Is shown by the "volume and cost" of bank
credit, 1. e. by their sales or purchases in the open mar-
ket and by discount rates on member banks* borrowing and by
rc
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buying rates on acceptances. In deciding on Its credit pol-
icy the Board had to weigh the advantages and disadvantages
of whatever action It would take. On one side low money
rates wight aid domestie business but stimulate speculation*
On the other side high money rates might decrease specula-
tion but injure business by the higher cost of credit* Then
too the high rates might bring more gold in. Thinking of the
purposes for which the Reserve system exists as outlined on
page 7£, the Board acted so that these purposes would bo
served and this accounts for the rapid increases in money
rates in 1928 when the Board wished to firm money while gold
was being exported and security loans were increasing so
rapidly*
That bankers and economists did not approve of the
FEDERAL RESERVE policy at this time is very evident from
their criticisms.
(1)
Carter Glass, one of the most outspoken, complained
of the misuse to which the system was being subjected by
speculation and of its failure to do the very thing for
whioh it was planned—to stop or "at least minimize this
drawing of funds from legitimate channels for speculation* *
Senator Glass admitted that he did not see just how the evil
could be corrected, but advised finding out whether the
fault was in the structure or in the management so that con-
(1) Glass, the Federal Reserve System Grossly Misused,
Review of Reviews, Sept. 19agL, p. 257
1
80
ditions could be corrected* He did not think that it wil
sensible or wise to conclude that the evils which it was te
correct were beyond all control*
%e are now ready to look at the picture for 1929.
Reserve Bank Holdings of United states Securities !
The holdings of United States securities for 1929 on
the whole decreased steadily, touching by November 1 a lou
level of $125,000,000, but by the end of November on account
of member banks taking ever loans of non-banking lenders,
the holdings had increased to over $500,000,000*
See chart Reserve Bank Holdings, page /<&
(1)
Reserve Bank Credit .
From January 1929 when Reserve Bank credit was high
there was a great decline until the lowest point for the year
was reached In May, but by midsummer Reserve Bank credit was
close to the average of that for the last five years* since
(2)
then there has been a sizable incroc.se, the latest report
showing the level very near that of a year ago* we have al-
ready seen how one of the three components of Reserve Bank
credit—United States security holdings—has varied. Of the
other twe—bills discounted for members aid acceptances
—
acceptances have showed a great variation, decreasing up te
June, but increasing until very recently* Discounts while
ranging in a wide area have been very large for the year*
1) Annual Report of Federal Reserve Board, 1928, p* 17
2) Federal Reserve Bulletin, Dec. 1929
,
p* 759
1
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One unusual reason for increase of Reserve Bank oredlt wet
the increase of money in circulation due to the demand for
the new currency last August*
See chart Reserve Bank Credit, page 75.
Piscount Rates ;
The money rates for the year as a whole reached almost
to the highest in the history of the system, considerably
higher than those for 1928, hut the closing months of 1929
brought reductions in all classes* the higher rates are ex-
plained by the continuance of 1928 conditions—-gold export,
large indebtedness of the member bank to the Reserve Banks,
increased demands of loans on securities and the finance pol-
icy of the Reserve Board. The high money rates here caused
individuals and corporations both here and abroad to offer
their funds to borrowers, with the result that it stopped
the growth of bank credit, brought a reversal of the gold
movement and caused foreign banks to raise their discount
rates to protect their reserves* In August the discount rate
in New Yor£ City was increased from 5% to 6$ to conserve the
resources of the FEDERAL RESERVE system, as well as to dis-
courage stock speculation* About the same time the Bank of
England increased its rate from 5 § l/2$ to 6,1/^ as was to
be expected, for during the last seven or eight years there
has been a difference of about 1$ between the rates of the
Reserve Bank of New York and Bank of England* The last
changes were those made by the Federal Reserve Board Novem-
/ t "j f * i si tat.- ± Ok»./i ix/y . , j 'u'
is
ber 1 decreasing the New York rate to 5$ and again on
November 15 to 4,1/2$, which is the present rate at five Of
the Reserve Banks. The reasons given by the Board for a
decrease v/ere to ease the money situation, perhaps stop busi-
ness recession and restore confidence.
Member Bank Credit and Borrowings ;
In 1929 member bank credit from a low point in May
reached by October the highest point In its history. IVhile
Investments decreased loans increased with loans on securities
showing an Increase of over &2 ,000 ,000 ,000. The latest re-
(1)
port on the loans and investments of the member banks shows a
decrease of a billion dollars in loans since October, but still
the level is over a billion greater than a year ago. Borrowing
by the member banks at the FEDERAL RESERVE Banks was large when
compared with the year before, the highest point being reached
in July when it was $801,000,000* Latest figures show the bor-
rowings close to the lowest for the year*
See chart, Loans and Investments, page 77.
The Gold Lovement ;
The diagram showing the holdings of gold by the United
States from 1914 to the present explains the references al-
ready made to the export and import of gold. It shows clearly
that the movement of gold in the last two years has been in a
narrow range when compared with 1914-17 or 1920-24. In 1927
(1) Federal Reserve Bulletin, Dec. 1929, p. 758
r
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the United states held about 40$ of the world's gold, but
with the large withdrawal of gold from the United states
in 1928 on acoount of the reeatablishment of the gold stand-
ard throughout the world, the FEDERAL RESERVE Banks were
strong enough to withstand that, and the increase of gold
in foreign countries was a benefit to world trade. There-
fore the United states was better off* During 1929 we find
an increasing amount for the first half of the year and a
gradual decrease since then* During the last few weeks
nearly one hundred millions of dollars have been exported,
but financial experts feel that the country is not likely
to lose enough gold to endanger Its credit position*
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Now we come to the policies of the FEDERAL RESERVE
(1) New England Letter, First National Bank of Boston,
Sept. 25 , 1929
t
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Board for 1929—the explanation of the phases previously
(1)
pointed out. Early in the year the Board cited the great
industrial and business activity of the United states during
the last six years and emphasized the important part played
by the credit system of the country in this prosperous period*
But they repeated that speculative loans were absorbing too
much of the credit of the country and voiced their disapproval
of that practice since the result was to increase the cost of
credit for commercial purposes by 1£ or l 9 l/2fi. Immediately
after this the Senate passed a resolution asking the Board,
in that it had complained of the large amount of funds being
absorbed in security loans to the detriment of the country's
commercial interests, to give to the Senate information and
suggestions which could be used for legislation which would
correct such an evil and stop harmful speculation* The
Board replied that it did not set itself up as a judge of
security speculations and values but did consider itself as
always responsible for credit conditions and would be glad
of legislation if it could not improve conditions*
Very soon after this the Board sent to all the Reserve
(2)
Banks the now famous letter of February 7 concerning the
restriction of the credit facilities of the Reserve system.
In this lotter the Board stated that the absorption of
oredit in the security market was increasing money rates to
business when money conditions should be easy and that the
(1) Federal Reserve Bulletin, Feb* 1939, p. 93
(2) Federal Reserve Bulletin, Feb* 1929, p. 94
Apr. 1929, p. 243
-
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Board was seeking the aid of the Reserve banks and member
banks In adjusting this credit situation* They felt that a
little progress had been made already as shown by the decline
in brokers' leans by member banks and they hoped for more im-
provement which would mean a decided change from recent
treads, a releasing of money for business and easing of the
money situation* They warned the banks that they—the Board
—
might have to resort to other means if this step was not taken
voluntarily by the banks, and added that they wished lower
money rates not only for the good of domestic business but
also because of the bad effeot of the drawing of gold from
abroad with its consequent advance in money rates there while
industrial depression was still noticeable. In their own
words. "The objective then of FEDERAL RESERVE policy in view
of domestic business and world trade conditions is readjust-
ment in the credit situation so that trade and Industry till
be assured of continuous bank credit at reasonable rates.
This was taken at once as a challenge to Wall Street
and the stock market. Champions of Wall street were sure of
(1)
the defeat of the Reserve system, and certain promoters of
speculation denounced "the FEDERAL RESERVE for Interfering
with the rise in stocks" and Inferred that • the stock market
would pay no attention to the warnings." On the other hand
any economists were sure that the Reserve authorities would
succeed by "selective deflation" in restraining stock specu-
lation so that commerce and Industry might prosper.
(1) Noyes, Federal Reserve and Speculative Markets,
Scribner«s, April 1929, p. 493
c
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Discussion was voluble in congress, and it became evident
that some thought the idea of restraining stock speculation
was net at all commendable*
The Reserve authorities knew that the success of their
plan would involve the cooperation of 27.000 bankers* To
their satisfaction the banks began immediately to cooperate
and assisted nobly with one important exception—that of the
National City Bank of New York* The chairman of this bank,
Chas. E. Mitchell, who is also a member of the FEDERAL
RESERVE Board, defied the Board in March when he offered to
supply the stock market with call money* In consequenoe of
this his dismissal from the Board was urged by senator
Carter Glass, one of the Bakers of the FEDERAL RESERVE Act.
To prove that the Reserve Board was not alone alarmed
at the situation we have the warning issued by Paul W.
(1)
Warburg, one of the ablest bankers of the country and a
former member of the Reserve Board, but recently a critio
of Reserve Board policies* In April he pointed out the
great amount of credit which was being used for stock spec-
ulations, and Bdiu "No central banking system may safely
permit its facilities to expand unless it is certain of its
ability to bring about concentration when circumstances
require."
From then on the perplexed public read of what seemed
to be a conflie* of the Reserve Board with the market*
(1 Griswold, Definite Reserve Policy, Mag* of Business
June 1929, p. 652
(2; Noyes Federal Reserve and Speculative Markets,
Scribner's, April 1929, p* 493
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(1)
In May H, P« Willis censured the Reserve authorities for
failing to conserve the lending power of the system and for
-oermitting such an enormous development of speculation*
(2)
In August came the"rate rise that shocked Wall
(3)
Street." Dr. David Friday in September attempted to prove
that the expansion of brokers 1 loans as a cause of withdraw-
ing oredit from industry and of raising money rates—the
theory of the Reserve Board—was an eoononio as veil as a
logioal fallacy. From the Bankers' convention in Chicago
in October issued a warning on account of the large amount
of speculative loans. The Reserve authorities seemed to
have no friends. But almost over night sentiment changed
—
the reason being the orash in the stock market in November.
The abrupt outcome and the justification of the policy
of the Reserve Board were pithily summarized in the Boston
(4)
News Bureau after the crash*
"What the FEDERAL RESERVE Board feared really happened
through the dropping of brokers' loans by §1,380,000,000
and out of town banks withdrawing $707,000,000 from the call
loan market. The Board has for months urged the policy of
holding down loans of member banks in the security market
and the latter did cooperate well. During these months the
Reserve officials have publicly pointed to the FEDERAL
(1) V.illis, Failure of the Federal Reserve, North
American Review, ifcty 1929
(2) Editorial Literary Digest, Aug. 24, 1929, p 46
(3) Friday, Is the Federal Reserve wrong? Review of
Reviews, Sept. Oct. 1929, p. 78
(4) Boston News Bureau, Nov. 4, 1929
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RESERVE Act—that reserve credit shall not be used to fi-
nance security dealings, but privately they nave said the
time might come when outside lenders in the call market
would withdraw their funds and member banks in New York
would have to step in to avert a panic* However they could
not emphasize this publicly." Concerning the discouraging
of borrowing the article continues* "The Reserve Board did
its best to keep member banks out of debt to Reserve Banks
as in August when money easing was brought about by open
market operations while the New York discount rate was put
so high as to discourage borrowing,. . . The Reserve Board pre-
pared for the break. It met daily and kept in touch with
conditions and watched the working out of their plans as pre-
viously made. •• .It is expected that Brokers* loans will be
downward for some time with the security market bidding less
urgently for funds. It is felt that general business condi-
tions Justify rates lower than are prevailing. However it
will be some weeks before such aotion could be put in effect,
but regional banks Could be expeoted to act when they think
conditions Justify it."
The Associated Press of October 30 had said prectioally
the same
;
"Business men declared that oommeroe, industry and
finance would emerge undisturbed and credit is given the
FEDERAL RESERVE Board for conducting the credit mechanism so
that fewer deposit funds have been available for the stock
market.... One result has been to put the Reserve system in a
It
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strong position. •• .Banks of all classes lent leas and lets
to brokers and dealers in securities against stock collat-
eral during the last month (October) M prices rose. On
the 24th of October the statement of brokers 1 loans showed
private money lenders were furnishing four billions to
finance stock holdings on margin, while all the banks of
the country were lending about two billion dollars. . . .It
waft remarkable that the FEDERAL RESERVE Board did not re-
ceive a single call for assistance during the crisis • "
(1)
&ark Sullivan in the Herald Tribune speaking of the ad-
vantages Of the FEDERAL RESERVE System said;
"The 1907 panic included a ourrency panic, an acute
stringency of credit and interest rates that went to sensa-
tional heights. There was no FEDERAL RESERVE System in 1907*
This year there is a FEDERAL RESERVE System. Due to its ex-
istence there is no currency panic, no marked difficulty in
getting credit for general business, and interest rates are
normal, or tend downward.
(2)
Colonel Ayres in the Cleveland Trust Bulletin said:
"General business has slowed down somewhat and will
probably slow down still more, but the losses in the stock
market have not impaired the soundness of our bonking
system."
(3)
The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin's editorial writer
{%) Mark Sullivan, Herald Tribune, Oct. 1929.
(2) Ayres, Cleveland Trust Bulletin, I^ov. 1929.
(3) Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Oct. 1929.
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said;
"There Is the strong sustaining vail of a banking sys-
tem which has set the test and proved Its worth* As a
atter of faot the FEDERAL RESERVE Board has striven since
February to avert the present debacle: but Its voice has
been as that of one crying in the wilderness, and other
oracles were heeded. The Board failed, it is true, to
bring about en orderly retreat, but the system irhich it ad-
ministers is clearly able to avert a panic."
President Hoover in his message to Congress December
2 said*
Fortunately the FEDERAL RESERVE System had taken
measures to strengthen the position against the day when
speculation would break* which together with the strong
position of the banks has carried the whole credit system
through the crisis without impairment."
The Board itself felt that the period of mild specula-
(2)
tion and high money rates had ended, but their latest report
says it is too early to judge bow the drop in security prioea
will affect the banking situation. They believe that the gen-
eral credit situation is better because of the great liquida-
tion of security loans even though bank credit has increased
with the taking over of the loans of the non-banking lenders,
and they expect that the banking system onn meet the demands
of trade and industry without any change of rates.
(1) pres. Hoover, Message to Congress, Deo. 2, 1929
(2) Federal Reserve Bulletin, Dec. 1929, p. 756.
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But lest it seem that there was praise only for tha
Reserve System after the crisis, we must consider some of
those critics who believed that the system was a real men-
aoe rather than a help at that time* One of these, S. P.
(1)
Arnot, president of the Chicago Board of Trade, blamed
the stock market crash on the Reserve Board on account of
"their vacillating policies," saying, "right or wrong, the
part played by the Federal Reserve Board In the great drama
will undoubtedly come in for the most intensive discussion
during the year."
(2)
In the Nation a very bitter editorial most severely
censured the policy of the Reserve Board, which it considered
the chief oauaa of the crash in the stock market* It called
to mind that pantos ware not to be possible on account of the
FEDERAL RESERVE System, but in its words, "the crisis came,
it was not throttled, and the market ran wild." The writer
emphasized the absence of the Reserve Board at the conference
of Now York bankers who met to stop the decline in prices
after the crash, and said bankers and brokers well knew that
the FEDERAL RESERVE was "the body primarily to thank for the
disaster" which the stock market suffered* The real cause
of the "disaster" according to this authority went back to
the policy of the Reserve Board in the late sumroer and early
fall of 1927, (See page^ when the Board reduced the redis-
(1) ..mot, Address to Nebraska Bankers assoc., Nov. 7,
1929. Assoc* Press.
(2) Editorial, The Men Who Did It, The Mation, Nov* 13
1929. D.539.
i
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count rates to assist In the financial rehabilitation of
Europe, and then purchased government bonds, thus releasing
that much more credit for speculative purposes* Warnings
of financiers and of editors of financial journals -con-
cerning this dangerous policy accomplished naught, and when
the condition became serious, the editorial continued, "the
Board bludgeoned the markBt with veiled threats; when finally
It acted, its action was drastic and too late
The bubble burst, and the bankers carried the brokers
but the FEDERAL RESERVE did not count."
This editor in his bitterness seems to have lost sight
of a very Important fact, and that is how it was possible
for the commercial banks to come to the aid of the declining
(1)
markot* The answer to that we learn from Uilliam T. Yetman,
who in his explanation of how the FEDERAL RESERVE saved the
whole situation at that time, pointed out that it was only
through •the cooperation of the FEDERAL RESERVE Banks that
the commercial banks found It possible to supply the funds
which vaere necessary to preserve and protect the solvency
of other commercial and financial Ins titut ions, u
How that we have made a survey of the FEDERAL RESERVE
Syatem covering Its entire 8&i e *'enoe » »• BhaU **** some
definite conclusions concerning It, after we have weighed
(1) Yetman, Boston Globe, Jan. 1, 19oO.

certain outstanding criticisms which we shall take one by
one*
First, there is that ubiquitous one of politics in the
Reserve system. That the charge of political expediency
will always be hurled at the Reserve Board no one doubts
since that is the charge which is apt to be made concerning
(1)
any government appointed board* In 1921 H. J* Dodge em-
phasized the recurrence of this charge on account of the
government appointed board, notwithstanding the fact that
(2)
the system itself is not government owned* Thos* Gammaok
in 1928 spoke more encouragingly concerning this criticism,
saying that there was much less comment of that sort in the
later years* He emphasized the lack of sense which such
oriticism betrayed in view of the fact that both of the
major politioal parties are always represented on the Re-
serve Board* These findings seem to agree with the facts
shown by the survey, with perhaps the single exception of
the Harding administration, and so we may conclude that the
bugbear of politics, while ever apt to oome to the fore, is
one of the charges concerning which there is little to fear*
Second is the oriticism of the Reserve System as a
Means of control of credit expansion* That the Reserve Sys-
tem can control and has controlled expansion of credit has
been proved in this survey, as in 1919, 1921 and 1929* But
(1) Dodge, Changing the Fundamental structure of the
Federal Reserve System, Annals, Sept. 1921, p. 76.
(2) Gammack, The Federal Reserve L3yth, Outlook, May 2,
1928, p. 28*
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the question of the time for the exeroise of this control
(1)
will ever be a Booted one. George Lorimer, touching on
this point said, "There will always be dispute whether the
action taken (by the FEDERAL RESERVE Banks) was hard and
fast enough* For such banks to pursue a consistent policy
without being charged with vacillation is extremely diffi-
cult. In doing each, a banking system must often run at
cross purpose 8 to current psychology, and thus receive
great unpopularity regrettable, but quite unavoidable,"
Lorimer suggested that certain changes might be made in the
laws by which the Reserve system could exercise greater con-
trol and so be more effective in times of stress, and pointed
out also the probability of the twelve Reserve Banks, on ac-
count of past experience, being able to "reduce the severity
of, if they cannot prevent, these lapses into economic bar-
barism. "
On tr other hand people like the editor of the Nation
(See page 91) would have us believe that the Reserve System
as a means of control of credit expansion was wprse than
nothing, for he made it the cause of over-expansion. If we
are to agree with him and think that the Reserve authorities
deliberately brought on such a condition, it means that all
their warnings during the past two years were hypocritical.
That I am not ready to believe for X trust the judgment of
those who seem to be fair critics. Therefore we may conclude
(1) Lorimer, Central Banking Policy, Saturday Evening
Post, Dec. 28, 1928, p. 20
v-
that the Reserve System Is the most satisfactory means yet
found to control expansion of credit and that there is hope
that with experience it will grow more perfect.
A third criticism is concerned with changes of detail
in the Reserve system and in its manner of functioning.
Commentators from post war days to the present have quite
Unanimously agreed on the soundness of the fundamentals of
(1)
the system. L. 2. Pierson, in 1925 in appraising the
system felt that it was an encouraging sign to find that
the suggestions for the improvement of the plan concerned
detail only, and net the fundamental principles. He
pointed out that such was to be expected since experience
only could test these new ideas and that no one could ever
foresee the effects of laws until they have been tried.
(2)
Recently Griswold divided the critics of the system into
two classes the detractors and the defenders. His sur-
prise concerning their comments was that both classes agreed
in defending the system, i.e., they did not attack the
fundamentals, but did disapprove of the "manner in which it
has functioned. " That there is much opportunity for im-
provement in the manner of the functioning of the Reserve
System is not denied, but it is only just to expect this to
(3)
oome with age and experience. William Bar£, writing on
this subject, reminds us that even the Bank of England did
(1) Pierson, .eighing the Federal Reserve, Bankers
Mag., July 1925, p. 79
(2) Griswold, Definite Reserve Policy, Mag. of Busi-
ness, June 1929, p. 650
(3) Hard, Behind the scenes with the Federal Reserve,
World 1 s work, June 1929, p. 49
ri
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not attain its position in the financial world in a short
time—it was a gradual building process which made possible
its high rank.
One agency which will be a very great material help in
the improved functioning of the Reserve System is the Divi-
sion of Research and Statistics. This division has already
rendered great assistance to the Reserve authorities, but,
according to Mr. Hard, within a period of twenty years
there will be such a wealth of information concerning detail
and procedure that with this as guide, the Reserve officials
ought to be able to formulate policies and methods of pro-
cedure very effectively.
A fourth criticism is concerned with the lack of policy
(1)
in the Reserve Syatem. Llany writers claim that the doings
of the Reserve Board indicate a lack of definite policy and
thus emphasize the weakness in the system. One member of
the present Board, Adolph Miller, does not deny this charge.
(2)
Since MT. Miller is the only economist on the Board and
also a life long member of the Board, his word should carry
much weight. He believes that the Board has made serious
mistakes in not showing the initiative which should by
right come from it, and thinks that it gives the impression
of not taking a definite step until forced to, with the
result that Its policy appears to be somewhere u between
(1) Griswold, Definite Reserve policy, Mag. of Busi-
ness, June 1929, p. 651
(2) Hard, Behind the Scenes with the Federal Reserve,
World's frork, June 1929, p. 48
f
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deliberate action and unconscious action." Glenn Grlswold,
(1)
writing on "Definite Reserve Policy a Business Necessity"
complains of the effect en business of this lack of stated
policy* He would have the Board follow a consistent pre-
cedent or a set of rules so that business men would be
able to decide what action the Board would be likely to
take concerning credit* Be believes that it is by opinion
and not by rules that the Board formulates action now with
the result that even experts cannot guess what action will
be taken* Business therefore will have to approach its
problems blindfolded until "by policy or consistent pre-
cedent* or both, the FEDERAL RESERVE Board makes it poss-
ible to anticipate its manipulations of credit."
(2)
On the other hand M. S. Rukeyser emphasizes the
opposite view concerning set rules in the FEDERAL RESERVE
system. His fear is that those who are dissatisfied with
the system will urge what he calls "patent medicine legis-
lative formulae" which will take the place of "banking
discretion on which sound finance must inevitably rest."
Since the reasoning of Rukeyser seems the more logical
from the point of view of scientific banking, it would
cause us tt conclude that rules would be more harmful
than helpful in the Reserve system. But there is hope
for the correction of the lack of policy which has been
apparent in thesystem, if the Board, composed of the right
(1) Griswold, Magazine of Business, June 1929, p. 650
(2) Rukeyser, Kail street and the Federal Reserve,
The Nation, Jan. 23, 1929, p. 103
<-
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kind »f members, will profit by the experience of the past
and of the future when It will have that great compilation
of Information being gathered by the Division of Research
and Statistics*
A fifth criticism closely allied to the last one is on
the Imperfections and defects of the system* We read of
those who criticise the system for Its strength, and of
those who criticize It for Its weakness, of those who blame
the financial disaster of 1929 on It and of those who claim
It saved the day during the panic* But even its stanch
supporters realize that the system is far from perfect and
that there are defects to be remedied* But when one realizes
that the FEDERAL RESERVE system Is the largest single banking
(1)
system in the world serving such a large area and such a
large population under so many varying conditions, it is
(2)
surprising that there are not more defects* Colonel Ayres
tells us that "banking Is almost Invincibly strong in the
united states.* Has not the Reserve System been an important
factor in making banking so strong? Can the defects and Im-
perfections be so very detrimental? Do we hear of bringing
the Reserve system to an end? An editorial In the Bankers*
(3)
Magazine would eliminate the Reserve Board on account of
its being government appointed, but there Is no suggestion
(1) Friedman, The Federal Reserve Fight, The Nation,
Oct. 12, 1927, p o59
(2) Ayers, Cleveland Trust Co. Bulletin, Dec. 15, 1929
(3) Federal Reserve System and Inflation, Bankers*
Magazine, Jan* 1930, p* 2
i
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of eliminating the Reserve System, The present publicity
in connection with the Reserve System will doubtless be a
great spur to the authorities to do their best to Improve
the most glaring defects and imperfections, thereby
strengthening if not perfecting the system which has made
(1)
the "Unite** states the world capital of finance."
We are newready to ask if the policies of the Reserve
Board as set forth In this survey and in the light of the
above criticisms have tended to forward the purposes (see
page 72) for which the FEDERAL RESERVE System was established*
The unbiassed judge must admit that the Reserve Board
1. Has done what seemed best to it to smooth rates of
interest for the nation*
2. Has attempted to make more credit available to
those entitled to it by refusing its approval of
it for stock speculation.
3* Has applied bank reserves to the purposes for
which they were Intended.
4. Has kept in mind the fundamental Interests for
all financial effort.
As to how much better these various provisions might
have been carried out. there will always be question. But
(1) Grlswold, Definite Reserve Policy, Mag. of Busi-
ness, June 1929, p. 650
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considering the outstanding work of the FEDERAL RESERVE
System In the time of war and its part in bringing the
country back to normal during the post war days, as well
as its power in "making the United states the world capital
ef finance and its strength on which the banks of the
country depended at the time of the panic of 1929, we can
truly say that in its short life it has met and conquered
many vicissitudes, and apparently has unlimited opportunity
for greater success and greater service In the years to
con;.
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